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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law reflects the intuitive understanding of creativity 
in the eyes of the law. This is because copyright law’s primary goal 
is to promote creativity.1 But is the legal understanding of creativity 
in line with cognitive psychology’s understanding of the creative 
process? This Article examines whether copyright law is harmo-
nious with cognitive psychology’s understanding of creativity. 
Some scholars posit that theories of creativity fit well with current 
copyright law. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review, 
                                                                                                                            
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress has the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science . . . .”); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that copyright’s “ultimate aim” is “to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 
820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby 
benefitting the artist and the public alike.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 
F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster 
creativity.”); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law 
should seek to promote . . . .”); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking 
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 
(2013) (“[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright that 
defines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on 
creativity).”). 
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Joseph Fishman, a scholar studying the relationship between intel-
lectual property and creativity, argued that, based upon some ac-
counts of creativity, copyright law’s constraints on creativity ac-
tually push authors to create more original and creative works.2 
This Article’s goal is to offer a broader assessment of creativity 
studies and to question whether they indeed fit with copyright 
law’s assumptions about creativity. 
This Article focuses on four main doctrines and concepts in 
copyright law. The first is the originality requirement in copyright 
law.3 The second is the concept of romantic authorship. The third 
is the idea/expression dichotomy that grants copyright protection 
to expressions and denies it to ideas.4 The fourth, which is closely 
related to the third, is the right to make derivative works.5 Copy-
right law treats derivative works separately from original works and 
creates, to some extent, an identity between derivative works and 
reproductions.6 This attitude toward derivative works is not easy to 
justify. This Article examines whether the cognitive psychology of 
creativity is consonant with this legal doctrine and how to best ap-
ply cognitive psychology’s findings to the law. 
The copyright doctrines discussed in this Article are based 
upon implicit and explicit assumptions about creativity. The origi-
nality doctrine, for example, is based upon the express assumption 
that creative works include an original contribution from the au-
thor.7  By contrast, the idea/expression dichotomy has a more im-
plicit assumption about creativity; it assumes that ideas are more 
important to the promotion of creativity than expressions. This 
implicit assumption is evidenced by different normative approach-
                                                                                                                            
2 See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1360–90 
(2015). Fishman’s argument is based upon the “path of least resistance” approach to 
creativity and empirical studies based upon it. Id. This Article discusses this approach to 
creativity as part of its broader theory of creative cognition, along with other approaches 
to creativity. See infra Section IV.B. 
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
4 See § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
5 See id. § 103(a). 
6 See id. 
7 See § 102(a). 
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es to copyright law, such as utilitarian analysis and natural rights 
theories, which suggest that non-protection of ideas is necessary 
for promoting creativity and that the protection of expression is 
harmful to creativity.8 The exclusive right to make derivative works 
is based upon a similar assumption. Under a utilitarian analysis, 
authors are properly granted an exclusive right to make derivative 
works, if we assume an original author’s incentive to create deriva-
tive works promotes creativity that outweighs the creativity that 
would result from second authors’ free access to preexisting ex-
pressions as the basis for the their works.9 In other words, the law 
assumes that the free making of derivative works is less important 
for promoting creativity than preserving the first author’s incentive 
to create “original” works. 
This Article contends that the law’s idea/expression dichoto-
my, which requires the same standard of review for both derivative 
works and reproductions, is not justified under cognitive psycholo-
gy’s understanding of the creative process. During the cognitive 
process of creation, authors utilize their prior knowledge to crys-
tallize abstract thoughts into new ideas. Specifically, authors em-
ploy domain-relevant knowledge and memory as building blocks in 
their creative process. Cognitive psychology posits that both ideas 
and expressions (in copyright terms) are possible knowledge com-
ponents that creativity is based on and identifies both types of 
knowledge as an inherent part of the creative process. This Ar-
ticle’s argument focuses on the descriptive-critical level, and ar-
gues that as far as the distinction between derivative works (based 
on expressions of previous works) and original works (that are 
based on abstract ideas or unprotected expressions) is concerned, 
there is a mismatch between copyright law and cognitive psycholo-
gy’s understanding of creativity. In fact, it is possible that the basic 
                                                                                                                            
8 For an economic analysis of the idea/expression dichotomy, see WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 91–92 (2003). For a Lockean justification for the idea/expression 
dichotomy, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1581–83 
(1993), and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 310–14 
(1988). 
9 For an economic analysis of the derivative work right, see LANDES & POSNER, supra 
note 8, at 108–15. For a critique on this analysis, see infra note 384. 
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idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law is also discordant with 
cognitive psychology. Although a shift to a new copyright regime is 
premature, a normative reevaluation of the legal justifications un-
derlying the current regime is proper, considering this Article’s 
conclusions. Additionally, the findings suggested in this Article 
could be used as a basis for a normative discussion under various 
approaches in the absence of other empirical data about the effects 
current copyright law has on creativity. 
Literature on the cognitive psychology of creativity includes 
theoretical literature as well as empirical and historical studies that 
seek to outline the various cognitive stages of the creative process 
and the common pattern of creativity identifiable in authors’ cogni-
tive process. This Article reviews the existing literature on the 
cognitive psychology of creativity, discusses its main characteris-
tics, and extracts several substantial notions about the various stag-
es of the creative process and the importance of previous know-
ledge and memory in the creative process. These notions demon-
strate that there is a gap between the way the law understands de-
rivative work and its place in the creative world. This gap warrants 
a reevaluation of the legal justifications underlying the exclusive 
right to make derivative works, the scope of this right, and the re-
medies for infringement.10 
The notion regarding the centrality of prior relevant knowledge 
in the creative process, and its role as a knowledge component for 
both ideas and expressions, is one of the grounds on which this Ar-
ticle argues that the law should conceptually separate mere repro-
ductions from the making of derivative works under copyright. 
Whereas mere reproductions are properly considered uncreative by 
cognitive psychology and the law, derivative works are the result of 
creative activity that is not qualitatively different from making an 
“original” work. To reflect this distinction between creative and 
                                                                                                                            
10 It is important to note that, although this Article argues that copyright law and the 
right to make a derivative work right should be analyzed in light of the cognitive 
understanding of creativity, the creative process—even in its cognitive context—is fluid 
and not predefined. It is likely that the cognitive process of creation is affected by various 
factors that are external to the author and only one of these factors may be the law. 
Nevertheless, the law’s effect on creativity should be scrutinized in order to maximize the 
law’s efficacy. 
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non-creative activities, copyright law should separate the reproduc-
tion right from the derivative work right. 
In addition, two other aspects of cognitive psychology could il-
luminate copyright law. First, the cognitive psychology of creativity 
could contribute to a better, more precise understanding of copy-
right law’s originality requirement. Copyright should embrace psy-
chology’s understanding that not every creative product should be 
considered entirely original. The second concerns copyright’s re-
quirement of an independent contribution by the author. Post-
modern copyright law purportedly utilizes a definition of indepen-
dent contribution that is significantly narrower than the “romantic 
author” approach, the predecessor to copyright’s current under-
standing of an independent contribution, which was criticized as 
too broad.11 The cognitive process of creativity strongly suggests 
that although a work of authorship has many sources external to 
the author, the author nevertheless has an independent contribu-
tion that cannot be disregarded. 
Before delving into the core arguments, it is important to out-
line several characteristics of cognitive psychology’s discourse on 
creativity. First, this field does not distinguish between creative 
activities that concern works of authorship in copyright terms and 
creative activities that concern inventions in patent law terms. 
Therefore, when necessary, this Article articulates the differences 
that may arise in light of this lack of differentiation. Second, the 
meaning of many terms in cognitive psychology is different from 
both common parlance and legal terminology. Two main terms 
warrant explanation here: The field of cognitive psychology uses 
the terms “problem” or “task” to refer to the goal driving the au-
thor’s creative process.12 Put differently, these terms mean the task 
that the creative activity revolves around.13 The creative environ-
ment in which the creative process takes place is referred to as a 
“domain,” and this Article uses the term “task-domain” often. 
This term means the creative environment relevant to the task the 
author seeks to complete. Another important point is the meaning 
                                                                                                                            
11 See infra notes 364–72 and accompanying text. 
12 See Todd I. Lubart, Models of the Creative Process: Past, Present and Future, 13 
CREATIVITY RES. J. 295, 297 (2001). 
13 See id. 
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of the term knowledge. In cognitive psychology, knowledge in-
cludes various components of information. Some of these may ap-
pear to copyright experts as ideas in their legal sense. However, as 
this Article points out, the term knowledge in cognitive psychology 
includes informational components that reflect expressions in the 
copyright sense.14 
This Article is organized in the following manner: Part I dis-
cusses cognitive psychology’s relevance to the law. Part II presents 
the predominant theories of the process of creation and emphasizes 
the main characteristics of each group of theories. Part III divides 
the cognitive process of creation into two main stages: the stage of 
abstract unfocused ideation, and the stage of crystallization of a 
preliminary idea using previous domain-relevant knowledge and 
memory. Part IV uses theoretical, empirical and historical research 
to explain the role of prior domain-relevant knowledge and memo-
ry in the process of creation. Finally, Part V discusses how the dis-
course of cognitive psychology and the notions extracted from it 
may affect copyright law and, specifically, the right to make deriva-
tive works. 
I. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 
A short discussion about the relevance of cognitive psychology 
to the law and the connection of these two fields of knowledge is 
appropriate. This discussion obviously has implications for the va-
lidity of the relationship between cognitive psychology of creativity 
and copyright law as this Article suggests. When a connection be-
tween the law and an extralegal field of knowledge is suggested, the 
first question to ask is what the relations between the two are. One 
                                                                                                                            
14 Two disclaimers are appropriate. First, this Article is not advocating for a direct link 
between the use of prior knowledge and memory in the creative process and the creation 
of derivative works in the legal context. In this sense, it does not argue that every work of 
authorship is a derivative work because many works are based upon knowledge that the 
law treats as a mere idea. The claim is limited to the argument that making derivative 
works—i.e., using prior knowledge that contains explicit protected expression as part of 
the creative process—is an inherent part of the creative process and is not qualitatively 
different from making an original work with preexisting “ideas.” Second, this Article 
does not suggest that the law’s distinction between original works and derivative works is 
impossible to justify normatively. Instead, this Article posits that this distinction is 
discordant with cognitive psychology’s understating of creativity. 
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option is a relation of subordination, meaning that the law should 
adapt itself to notions from the extralegal field. A second option is a 
relation of description, explanation, and projection, meaning that 
the extralegal field explains the law and the legal rules and de-
scribes their effects on the real world. A third option, sometimes 
derived from the second, is a utilitarian relation, meaning that the 
extralegal field could be used as a tool to design rules that will best 
achieve the law’s goals.15 The relation between the law and an 
extralegal field is derived from that field’s characteristics and theo-
retical goals. If the extralegal field has a normative goal, the first 
type of relation is concerned. If, on the other hand, the extralegal 
field has a descriptive goal, then the second or third relations are 
relevant. This is demonstrated by the relation between economics 
and psychology, and the relation between both and the law. 
As far as economics is concerned, the neoclassical economic 
theory could be viewed as normative because it proposes a maxim 
of good that people should adhere to. This normative maxim of 
wealth maximization is based on the Benthamian approach that “it 
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure 
of right and wrong.”16 A more concrete conceptualization of wealth 
maximization is the sum of subjective individual preferences. To 
apply the normative aspect of the economic theory, economists de-
veloped a secondary theory that is mostly descriptive. Thus, for 
example, the neoclassical economic theory assumes that human 
beings behave rationally.17 This assumption serves as a foundation 
for explaining and predicting the conditions that will maximize the 
sum of private preferences. Mathematical tools, such as formal 
models could inform how this normative maxim is best fulfilled. 
                                                                                                                            
15 For a similar analysis, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998), which 
suggests that different approaches to the law could be positive, descriptive, or normative, 
and Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1997). 
Steven Shavell, for example, recognized that the economic analysis in the context of law 
has a normative aspect as well as a descriptive one. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–2 (2004). 
16 JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT vi (1776). 
17 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 18 (1994). 
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Cognitive psychologists claim their field has an explanatory and 
descriptive purpose, which follows from its place in the natural 
sciences, as this branch of science aims to describe phenomena in 
the world. Cognitive psychology seeks to examine and explain how 
people perceive and process information.18 The scientific aspect of 
the field is best demonstrated by reviewing the names of its sub-
fields, such as experimental cognitive psychology, cognitive 
sciences, and cognitive neuroscience.19 Cognitive neuroscience, 
which examines the relationship between cognitive processes and 
biological processes in the human brain, is a clear example of cogni-
tive psychology’s explanatory and descriptive purpose.20 Addition-
ally, in the remaining subfields of cognitive psychology, the de-
clared research methodology is empirical and the aim of the re-
searchers is to describe and explain information processing.21 
The combination of economics and psychology—cognitive 
psychology, specifically—and of both with the law, demonstrates 
the different types of relationships discussed above. After refusing 
to acknowledge psychology as science for decades, economic 
theory began to absorb notions from the field of cognitive psychol-
ogy in the second half of the twentieth century.22 This led to the 
development of behavioral economics, an economic theory that 
reviews basic assumptions and premises in neoclassical economics 
in order to develop better and more accurate assumptions.23 For 
example, behavioral economics challenges the rationality assump-
tion, which holds that human beings behave rationally to maximize 
their wealth and is an integral component of neoclassical econom-
                                                                                                                            
18 See MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A 
STUDENT’S HANDBOOK 1–3 (4th ed. 2000); Keith J. Holyoak, Psychology, in THE MIT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES xxxix (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil 
eds. 1999). 
19 See EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 18, at 3. 
20 See id. at 16–17; Thomas D. Albreit & Helen J. Neville, Neurosciences, in THE MIT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES, supra note 18, at li. 
21 See EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 18, at 3–12. 
22 See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, 
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 5–7 (Colin F. Camerer & George 
Lewenstein eds., 2004). 
23 See id. at 7. 
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ics.24 However, behavioral economics and notions from the field of 
psychology did not lead to the rejection of the normative premises 
of neoclassical economics, which are centered on achieving wealth 
maximization.25 This is because principles of psychology have in-
fluenced only the theoretical level of economics, which is descrip-
tive and explanatory rather than normative. 
This is evident in the legal context as well. The basic premises 
of neoclassical economics entered the legal field and led to the de-
velopment of economic analyses of law.26 Economic theory was 
applied to law in two aspects as well, normative and descriptive. 
Thus, the economic analysis of law is based on the underlying nor-
mative standpoint that society should strive for wealth maximiza-
tion.27 Additionally, the economic analysis of law as a descriptive 
enterprise assumes—as neoclassical economics does—that human 
beings behave rationally. This assumption underlies economic ana-
lyses’ predictions about human decision-making and the outcome 
of different legal rules.28 Notions from psychology (and cognitive 
psychology, specifically) entered the legal field primarily under the 
economic analysis of law as a descriptive and explanatory theory. 
Thus, the same notions about human behavior that substituted the 
rationality assumption (and others) in neoclassical economics were 
applied to law to import behavioral economics to the legal con-
text.29 Here, too, the psychological notions had nothing to do with 
the normative aspect of the discussion; instead, only descriptive 
and explanatory psychological principles were applied to the law.30 
                                                                                                                            
24 See generally Kahneman, supra note 17; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational 
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251 (1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
25 See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 22, at 3. 
26 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 4. 
27 See id. at 1–4; see also Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 
J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979). 
28 See SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 4. 
29 See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Tahler, supra note 15; Sunstein, supra note 15. 
30 See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1997) (critiquing the application of behavioral economics to the 
law by arguing that behavioral economics does not suggest a new normative maxim that 
neoclassical economics did not account for). This criticism is overstated because the 
purpose of importing behavioral notions into both economics and law was not normative; 
rather, it satisfied explanatory and descriptive goals. 
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The study of creativity within cognitive psychology is a scientif-
ic field that seeks to describe and explain the cognitive processes 
underlying creative behavior.31 The scientific aspect of creativity 
research is evident in many empirical studies, conducted under 
various methodologies, that aim to explain and measure different 
aspects of creative behavior.32 The theoretical goal of this Article is 
to evaluate notions about creativity from the field of cognitive psy-
chology and to use them as explanatory and descriptive tools to 
improve copyright law. Like the psychological notions in economic 
analysis, the discussion in this Article does not suggest an indepen-
dent normative theory of copyright. However, the data and find-
ings presented in this Article could lead to a better understanding 
of the existing legal rules that govern creative behavior and their 
relation to human behavior, and, thus, to a better application of ex-
isting normative approaches to the law. 
II. THE CREATIVE COGNITION—THEORIES 
The birth of the modern understanding of the cognitive process 
of creation is attributed to British psychologist Graham Wallas and 
his book The Art of Thought, which was published in 1926.33 In his 
                                                                                                                            
31 See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, The Concept of Creativity: Prospects 
and Paradigms, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 3, 7 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999]. For a critical analysis of whether creativity 
studies are scientific, see Robert T. Brown, Creativity: What Are We to Measure?, in 
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 3, 6–8 (John A. Glover, Royce R. Ronning & Cecil R. 
Reynolds eds., 1989) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1989]. 
32 For a discussion of research measuring creativity, see Dennis Hocevar & Patricia 
Bachelor, A Taxonomy and Critique of Measurements Used in the Study of Creativity, in 
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1989, supra note 31, at 53, and Jonathan A. Plucker & Joseph 
S. Renzulli, Psychometric Approaches to the Study of Human Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF 
CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 35. For a discussion of empirical research based on 
experimental studies, see Mark A. Runco & Shawn Okuda Sakamoto, Experimental 
Studies of Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 62. For a 
discussion of the biological aspects of creativity and cognitive neuroscience research, see 
Arne Dietrich, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Creativity, 11 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 
1011 (2004); Colin Martindale, Biological Bases of Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF 
CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 137; and Keith Sawyer, The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Creativity: A Critical Review, 23 CREATIVITY RES. J. 137 (2011). 
33 See GRAHAM WALLAS, THE ART OF THOUGHT (1926). Creativity was discussed in 
ancient times as well. Plato and Aristotle, for example, discussed the sources of creativity, 
and in ancient Greece, the Greeks believed that Zeus and his nine daughters, the muses, 
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book, Wallas described various cognitive stages of the creative 
process that became the basis for current theories of creativity. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, cognitive psychologists 
strived to develop a comprehensive model of the creative process. 
This Part presents the predominant theories of the cognitive 
process of creation. In addition to outlining these approaches, this 
Part shows that, despite their differences, they all dedicate signifi-
cant discussion to authors’ use of prior domain-relevant know-
ledge, memory, and heuristics in the creative process. For this pur-
pose, this Part uses the taxonomy offered in the field of cognitive 
psychology for the different approaches,34 while referring to origi-
nal literature and additional scholarship in order to conceptualize 
different approaches to the creative process. 
A. Stage and Componential Process Theories 
The modern stage and componential approaches to creativity 
are a direct continuation of Wallas’ scholarship, and therefore, to 
understand them, it is important to first describe his stage theory of 
creativity. Wallas hypothesized that four stages formed the creative 
process: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.35 
The preparation stage consists of a preliminary identification of 
the problem or task at hand and its definition.36 Conscious think-
ing, reliance on the author’s prior knowledge, expertise, and ana-
lytical capabilities, and other components that draw from the au-
                                                                                                                            
were the source of creative thought. See ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: 
UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING, SCIENCE, INVENTION, AND THE 
ARTS 90–92 (2006). In modern times, the beginning of scholarly thought about creativity 
is attributed to Sigmund Freud and Henri Poincaré, who saw the source of creativity in 
unconscious thinking. See id. at 92–94. 
34 See Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto & Mark A. Runco, Theories of Creativity, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 20, 30–35 (James C. Kaufman & Robert J. 
Sternberg eds., 2010). 
35 See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 80. 
36 See id. at 82–84. The literature on cognitive psychology typically uses the term 
“problem” to describe the beginning of the creative process. The meaning of this term is 
not identical to its common meaning; instead, it is more closely related to the term 
“task.” The term refers to a wide range of instances that could lead to creative activity, 
whether it is a specific professional or logical problem that needs to be solved, and 
whether it is the beginning of a task (professional, artistic, scientific or otherwise) that is 
ill-defined. See Lubart, supra note 12, at 297. This Part uses the terms “problem” and 
“task” to describe the task an author pursues during the creative process. 
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thor’s domain-relevant knowledge, characterize this stage.37 The 
incubation stage is characterized by a lack of conscious thought 
about the task, and the author often consciously engages in other 
problems and tasks.38 At this stage, unconscious processes occur, 
which consist mainly of associative thinking and the combination of 
ideas.39 In the illumination stage, a promising idea breaks into the 
consciousness of the author, who identifies that an idea is crystal-
lizing in his mind intuitively.40 Finally, in the verification stage, the 
author works consciously and examines, refines, and develops the 
idea that passed into his consciousness during the illumination 
stage.41 The author also examines the validity of the idea and crys-
tallizes it into its exact form.42 
Wallas’ stage theory was the basis for empirical studies that 
sought to verify his theory. In addition, the theory was the basis for 
more elaborate theoretical models in the same spirit.43 However, 
Wallas’ division to four stages was too vague to account for the var-
ious characteristics of the creative process, and his focus on the 
different components included in each stage lacked detail.44 For 
example, Wallas did not explain the relationship between the dif-
ferent stages or their significance and position in the creative 
process.45 In addition, Wallas did not explain the sub-processes of 
each stage, which was particularly problematic for the incubation 
stage.46 One of the most significant models that was developed on 
the basis of Wallas’ stage theory in order to fill in the gaps was Te-
resa Amabile’s componential model to creativity, which was first 
                                                                                                                            
37 See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 82–84 (describing the author at the preparation stage 
as an “educated” person who is proficient in distinguishing between ideas and memory 
encoding, and has gathered a wide spectrum of facts that allow him more associative 
possibilities); see also Lubart, supra note 12, at 296. 
38 See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 86. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 97. 
41 See id. at 81. 
42 See id. 
43 See, e.g., Sandra E. Moriarty & Bruce G. Vandenbergh, Advertising Creatives Look at 
Creativity, 18 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 162, 166 (1984) (identifying Wallas’ four stages 
through a qualitative survey of advertisers’ work); see also Lubart, supra note 12, at 297 
(classifying Amabile’s approach as a continuation of Wallas’ work). 
44 See Lubart, supra note 12, at 299. 
45 See id. at 298–99. 
46 See, e.g., id. 
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introduced in her book The Social Psychology of Creativity, published 
in 1983,47 and later updated in her 1996 book, Creativity in Con-
text.48 
Amabile, as well as Wallas, suggested four main stages in the 
creative process. Her first stage is the problem or task presentation 
stage.49 This stage comes into play when the author is highly moti-
vated to identify a problem or to engage in a task, or when the prob-
lem or task are presented by an external entity.50 The second stage 
is the preparation stage, which Amabile defined as the stage where 
the author constructs or activates a task-relevant knowledge data-
base.51 When the author has sufficient task-relevant knowledge and 
expertise, this stage may be significantly shortened.52 The third 
stage is the response generation stage in which the author gene-
rates possible responses to the task or problem by searching, con-
sciously or unconsciously, for possible solution paths.53 The fourth 
stage is the response validation stage, which Amabile described as 
the stage in which task-relevant knowledge and skills have a signifi-
cant role.54 In this stage, the potential generated responses are ana-
lyzed using existing knowledge and formed in a way that will fit the 
solution and be functional.55 
In addition to her four stages, Amabile emphasized three cogni-
tive components that come into play in each of the stages.56 The 
first component, and the most important one for the purpose of 
this Article, is the domain-relevant skills component.57 Amabile 
defined this component as one that contains all possible responses 
                                                                                                                            
47 See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY (1983) 
[hereinafter AMABILE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]. 
48 See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996) [hereinafter 
AMABILE, CONTEXT]. 
49 See id. at 95. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. This Article uses task-relevant knowledge to refer to knowledge that is 
relevant to the environment of the creative activity. This means the knowledge and 
expertise that are related to the specific creative environment and tradition. 
53 See id. at 55–56. 
54 See id. at 96. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 83. 
57 See id. at 85. 
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that the author can perceive.58 A new response is generated from 
this pool of possible responses and then validated using task-
relevant information and knowledge.59 This component also in-
cludes the author’s prior factual knowledge about the task-domain 
that consists of facts, principles, common paradigms, and aesthetic 
criteria, as well as technical abilities that are necessary for the task-
domain.60 She argued that there is significant importance in the 
way task-relevant knowledge is stored and coded; information 
coded by general principles will be more useful to the author than a 
bundle of facts with narrow applicability.61 This component was 
identified by Amabile as mainly within the preparation and re-
sponse validation stages.62 
The second component Amabile identified is creativity-
relevant skills.63 She defined this component as the “something 
extra” that is required for creative activity.64 It is what determines 
the amount that by which the new idea surpasses the old ideas that 
it is built upon.65 Without creative-relevant skills, even authors 
with excellent task-relevant skills will be unable to create a new 
product.66 Amabile offered the following set of characteristics to 
describe this component: the ability to break through common con-
ceptions; the ability to develop new cognitive systems for problem 
solving; the ability to understand complex situations; the ability to 
maintain a wide range of available responses over time; suspension 
of response validation; the use of the widest categories possible; 
and precise memory and creative conception of works in the 
world.67 This component includes knowledge about the task-
                                                                                                                            
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 85–86. This component includes knowledge of the general technique that is 
related to the relevant task and, more importantly, knowledge and familiarity with 
concrete previous instances that are related to the task and could be used to complete the 
relevant task. This means that the task-relevant knowledge also includes visual (or 
audible) memory of previous works known to the author. See id. 
61 See id. at 95. 
62 See id. at 95–96. 
63 See id. at 86–90. 
64 See id. at 86. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 88. 
67 See id. at 88–89. 
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relevant heuristics that could operate in both an explicit and con-
scious mode or in an implicit and unconscious one.68 Amabile iden-
tified this component as related to the response generation stage.69 
The third component Amabile identified is task motivation.70 
This component distinguishes between the author’s inner task-
motivation (i.e., the personal interest the author has in a specific 
task) and outer task-motivation (i.e., a social or professional con-
straint that obliges the author to engage with a specific task).71 Ac-
cording to Amabile, while the first enhances creativity, the latter 
inhibits the author’s creative abilities.72 The motivation component 
affects both the task presentation and the response validation stag-
es.73   
In another example, cognitive psychologists Mark Runco and 
Ivonne Chand introduced a five-component model for creativity in 
1995.74 These components are divided into two tiers.75 The first 
tier consists of problem finding, idea finding, and evaluation com-
ponents.76 The problem-finding component includes identifying 
and defining a problem or task, and the idea finding component re-
flects creativity and mental flexibility.77 The evaluation component 
reflects critical thinking about an idea.78 The second tier includes 
knowledge (divided into declarative and procedural knowledge) 
and motivation (divided into internal and external motivation).79 
Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge of strategies that facili-
                                                                                                                            
68 See id. at 89. Amabile defined “heuristics” as any principle or instrument that 
contributes to the reduction of the average solution search time. See id. (citing Allen 
Newell et al., The Processes of Creative Thinking, in CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO 
CREATIVE THINKING: A SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 63, 78 
(Gruber et al. eds., 1962)). 
69 See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 94. 
70 See id. at 90–93. 
71 See id. at 90–91. 
72 See AMABILE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 47, at 91. 
73 See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 93. 
74 See Mark A. Runco & Ivonne Chand, Cognition and Creativity, 7 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 243, 245 (1995). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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tate accomplishing task-relevant processes (i.e., know-how).80 Dec-
larative knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the author’s factual 
knowledge.81 Runco and Chand placed these components in the 
second tier because they contribute to the creative process more 
than they control it.82 
Despite the similarities between Runco and Chand’s and Ama-
bile’s models, some differences should be articulated. While Ama-
bile attributed the task-relevant skills to the preparation and re-
sponse validation stages, Runco and Chand argued that knowledge 
(declarative and procedural) affects not only the problem-finding 
stage, but also the idea finding stage.83 This is significant because 
Amabile identified a stage in the creative process where prior 
knowledge has no contribution, whereas Runco and Chand posited 
that knowledge affects every stage of the creative process.84  
The componential models to creativity were criticized on sev-
eral grounds. First, because these approaches suggest a wide array 
of components that are interrelated, they were criticized due to 
lack of parsimony.85 Second, the models are difficult to verify em-
pirically because every component must be identified and meas-
ured separately to reach a valid conclusion.86 Third, the approaches 
                                                                                                                            
80 See id. at 246. 
81 See id. It is important to emphasize that the term “factual knowledge” does not refer 
to facts in the copyright sense. The meaning of the term is visual, semantic, or symbolic 
knowledge that includes all task-relevant details in the author’s memory. In this sense, 
factual knowledge could consist of informative factual knowledge as well as concrete 
expressions of preexisting task-related works. For example, when a painter seeks to paint 
a sunflower field, several types of knowledge could come into play. Procedural knowledge 
in this context includes painting methods and techniques, and the painter’s professional 
abilities and expertise. Declarative knowledge in this context consists of several types of 
information as well. Simple facts include the painter’s acquaintance with the sunflower 
and its visual form in nature. Another type of declarative knowledge is preexisting visual 
works use of sunflowers in different visual ways and any specific visual images of 
sunflowers. 
82 See id. at 245–46. 
83 See id. at 245. 
84 See id. 
85 See Todd I. Lubart, Componential Models, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY 295, 
299 (Mark A. Runco & Steven R. Pritzker eds., 1999). 
86 See id. 
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do not explain which stage or component is most important to crea-
tivity.87 
Every one of the models in the stage and componential ap-
proaches dedicates significant attention to knowledge-based com-
ponents throughout the creative process. In Wallas’ theory, the use 
of prior knowledge is evident in both the preparation stage, when 
the author uses his previous education and knowledge, and the va-
lidation stage, in which the author validates the creative product in 
light of his task-relevant knowledge.88 Under Amabile’s approach, 
prior knowledge plays a significant role in task presentation, prepa-
ration, response generation, and validation.89 In the preparation 
and validation stages, according to Amabile, the author uses his 
task-relevant skills, which include factual (semantic) knowledge.90 
Runco and Chand, for their part, emphasized the use of task-
relevant declarative knowledge in every part of the creative 
process.91 
Under each of these theories, the use of prior knowledge con-
sists of various types of information that could be used as a basis for 
a work of authorship. Ideas (in their legal sense) are obviously in-
cluded as well as methods, processes, and other abstract compo-
nents that are essential to the creative process. However, the de-
scription of the task-relevant knowledge under these theories in-
cludes the use of knowledge components that reflect concrete and 
explicit expressions (in the legal sense) formed from works that are 
stored in the author’s memory. Both types of knowledge could be 
the basis of creative activity under cognitive psychology. 
Copyright law only partially matches the cognitive understand-
ing of creativity. With respect to the use of prior knowledge in pre-
liminary phases of the creative process—for example, in the input 
and processing phases (reflected in the preparation and incubation 
stages in Wallas’ model, 92 or the preparation and response genera-
                                                                                                                            
87 See id. at 289–99. 
88 See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 80, 86. 
89 See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 94. 
90 See id. 
91 See Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 248. 
92 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
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tion stages in Amabile’s model)93—copyright law allows the use of 
any type of knowledge that the theories consider. This is because 
copyright law is not interested in the preliminary phases of creativi-
ty. It is concerned only with the concrete final creative product: the 
output. With regard to the output, however, copyright law allows 
the use of ideas or unprotected expressions as the basis for creativi-
ty, but it does not allow the use of protected expressions (with 
some exceptions, including the fair use doctrine). This is in con-
trast to the approaches presented above that view expressions as 
relevant knowledge types for creativity in all of their phases.94 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that Wallas and Ama-
bile identified stages in the creative process where the author has 
an individual contribution and prior knowledge does not play a 
role.95 This is evident in Wallas’ illumination stage and in Ama-
bile’s response generation stage.96 Even in Runco and Chand’s 
model, which holds that knowledge affects every stage of the crea-
tive process, there is specific attention to the author’s individual 
contribution to the creative process in the ideation stage.97 These 
findings support copyright law’s originality requirement, which 
affords copyright protection only when the author’s expression 
displays a modicum of creativity original to the author.98 This is in 
contrast to post-modern approaches that reject the “romantic au-
thor” approach.99 In this sense, copyright law matches the cogni-
tive understanding of creativity. 
B. Creativity as a Cognitive Process 
Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto, and Mark A. Runco, re-
searchers in the field of cognitive psychology who study the crea-
                                                                                                                            
93 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra notes 35–91 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra notes 35–73 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 40, 53 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text. 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship. . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
99 The “romantic author” approach sees the individual author as the only source for 
any work of authorship and describes the creative process as an individual endeavor in 
which the work is created out of nothing. See infra Section V.B. 
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tive process, identified a group of theories that concentrates on 
cognitive processes that characterize the creative process, which 
they named “cognitive theories.”100 These approaches aim to 
identify cognitive abilities and processes that are necessary for cre-
ative activity and focus on the process of creation and on the au-
thor.101 The main difference between this group of approaches and 
the stage and componential theories is that the cognitive theories 
do not concentrate on the timeline of the creative process or on the 
chronological stage at which sub-processes take place. Instead, they 
focus on the type of cognitive processes that are relevant and ne-
cessary for creativity. 
American psychologist J.P. Guilford, who tried to distinguish 
between divergent and convergent thinking, developed one of the 
most important models in this group of theories.102 Divergent 
thinking refers to the unfocused process of associative thought that 
leads to different directions and may cause an original task-relevant 
idea to occur.103 Convergent thinking, in contrast, occurs when 
cognition seeks to find a correct, applicable, and usable solution 
that fits task-relevant conventions, mainly using deduction.104 At 
this stage, there is significant use of stored memory that affects the 
creative product.105 
A similar model was suggested by John R. Suler who referred to 
two sub-processes in the creative process—primary and second-
ary—based upon principles of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis.106 
The primary sub-process of thinking usually occurs unconsciously 
and was described by Suler as more primitive than the secondary 
sub-process.107 During this sub-process, memories and past expe-
riences mix together; thought is mainly metaphoric because the 
                                                                                                                            
100 See Kozbelt, Beghetto & Runco, supra note 34, at 31. 
101 See id. 
102 See J.P. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 138 (1967); see also 
WEISBERG, supra note 33, at 95–97. 
103 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 138. 
104 See id. at 171. 
105 See id. at 313–15. 
106 See John R. Suler, Primary Process Thinking and Creativity, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 144 
(1980). 
107 See id. 
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borderlines between memories are fuzzy.108 In contrast, the second 
sub-process is characterized by conceptual organization of memo-
ry.109 In this sub-process, the author is able to access and control 
the unfocused thoughts developed in the primary sub-process and 
crystallize them into socially meaningful products.110 
Liane Gabora, a researcher who contributed to this line of theo-
ries, observed that the creative process requires phases of unfo-
cused and focused thought and the ability to combine the two.111 
Gabora’s significant contribution in this context is the use of tools 
from neuroscience and the cognitive sciences to propose a biologi-
cal conceptualization of these processes.112 Gabora explained that 
the human memory is “stored” in neurons and each neuron is re-
sponsible for the storage of several memories.113 Each memory is 
split between different neurons.114 Access to stored memories de-
pends on contextual stimulations; a specific stimulation activates a 
group of cells containing various neurons that respond to the sti-
mulation.115 Gabora argued that in a state of unfocused thought 
many cell groups and their respective neurons, which are otherwise 
inactive, are activated,.116 These excess neurons are referred to as 
“neurds.”117 Thus, Gabora proposed that the purpose of unfo-
cused thought is to gather neurds to use as a solution for the rele-
vant task or problem.118 The relevant neurons will pass through to 
the focused thought and the author will use them to crystallize a 
concrete idea.119 According to this approach, which was named the 
                                                                                                                            
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 145. 
110 See id. at 145–46. 
111 See Liane Gabora, Revenge of the ‘Neurds’: Characterizing Creative Thought in Terms 
of the Structure and Dynamics of Memory, 22 CREATIVITY RES. J. 1 (2010). 
112 See id. at 3. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 5. 
115 See id. at 5–6. 
116 See id. at 9. 
117 See id. at 12. 
118 See id. at 9. 
119 See id. 
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“honing theory of creativity,” unfocused thought leads to original 
but impractical ideas that are honed using focused thought.120   
Ronald A. Finke, Thomas B. Ward, and Steven M. Smith pre-
sented a different theory of creativity called the “Geneplore” 
model in 1992.121 The name of the model is derived from its main 
two processes, generate and explore, which that are subject to con-
straints that depend on the creative product.122 Fink, Ward, and 
Smith defined the model as more heuristic than explanatory, and 
said its aim is to show that most creative activities could be de-
scribed in terms of primary production of potential ideas followed 
by thorough research of these ideas.123 Different types of idea pro-
duction processes include restoring memory structures, creating 
simple associations from these structures, and recombining them 
or transferring the memory structures to new forms.124  
It is important to clarify that the term “ideas” in the context of 
the Geneplore model does not have the same meaning as the 
equivalent legal term; rather, it refers to the production of any part 
of the creative product.125 Different types of exploration processes 
include the search for new characteristics of mental structures, the 
search for compatible metaphors, the search for new operability of 
existing memory structures, and the evaluation of the potential to 
use them in different contexts.126 This model does not distinguish 
between generation and exploration processes and posits that the 
author switches between different modes many times throughout 
the creative process.127 Finally, the Geneplore model assumes that 
the relevant task or the end product can cast constraints on both 
                                                                                                                            
120 See Nicholas Davis & Ellen Yi-Luen Do, Quantifying the Artistic Experience with 
Perceptive Sketching Tools: Cognitive Technologies to Support Creativity Researchers, 22 
COMUNICAÇÃO & SOCIEDADE 76, 80 (2012). 
121 See RONALD A. FINKE, THOMAS B. WARD & STEVEN M. SMITH, CREATIVE 
COGNITION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS 17–43 (1992). 
122 See id. at 17–28. 
123 See Thomas B. Ward, Steven M. Smith & Ronald A. Finke, Creative Cognition, in 
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 189, 191. 
124 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 20; Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 
123, at 191–92; Lubart, supra note 12, at 299–300. 
125 See Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191. 
126 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 26; Lubart, supra note 12, at 299–300; 
Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191–92. 
127 See Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191. 
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processes at any point during the creative process.128 An example 
of such constraints is restricted resources of limited operability.129 
These approaches best illustrate the general division of the cre-
ative process into two sub-processes: the unfocused phase, in 
which abstract ideas are created,130 and the focused phase, in which 
the ideas are crystallized into concrete form.131 Guilford, Suler, and 
Gabora made an explicit division between these two stages: They 
showed that the focused phase of creativity is characterized by uti-
lizing prior task-relevant knowledge and memory.132 Guilford and 
Gabora stressed that stored memory plays a crucial part in creativi-
ty.133 Though they did not explicitly define whether this use of 
memory includes ideas or expression in copyright terms, they did 
refer to the use of complete memory units,134 and it is more than 
likely that such a use consists of both ideas and expression. Finke, 
Ward, and Smith, for their part, showed that knowledge and mem-
ory play a significant role in every phase of creativity.135 In addition, 
the idea generation part of their model is specifically characterized 
by the restoration of existing memory structures and recombination 
in order to produce new creative products.136 Here, too, there was 
reference to the use of preexisting expression (in copyright terms) 
as a basis for creativity, since these memory structures are capable 
of bearing concrete expressions as well as ideas. When a memory 
structure that holds task-relevant preexisting works is restored, it is 
more than likely that it will contain expressions rather than mere 
ideas.137 
A substantial match between the cognitive approaches to crea-
tivity and copyright law is evident here as well. Copyright law al-
lows the use of many types of knowledge and memory components 
                                                                                                                            
128 See, e.g., id. 
129 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 26. 
130 See id. at 17. 
131 See id. 
132 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 108, see also WALLAS, supra note 33, at 81; Gabora, 
supra note 111, at 3; Suler, supra note 106, at 144–45. 
133 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 139; Gabora, supra note 111, at 14. 
134 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 116; Gabora, supra note 111, at 9–10. 
135 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 20. 
136 See id. at 20–21. 
137 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 20; Lubart, supra note 12, at 299–300; 
Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191–92. 
310          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:287 
 
for the crystallization of unfocused ideas into concrete creative 
products.138 Among these are abstract ideas (or methods, facts and 
processes) as well as unprotected expression (in the public domain 
or by fair use).139 However, as far as the use of protected expres-
sions during the output phase of creativity is concerned, there is a 
mismatch between copyright law’s derivative work right and the 
cognitive theories of creativity. 
Similar to the discussion of theories about the stages of creativi-
ty, the creative cognition theories focus on the independent contri-
bution of the author to the creative product. Notably, Guilford, Su-
ler, and Gabora’s models included a phase of unfocused cognition 
that is not related to the use of prior knowledge.140 It also appeared 
in the Geneplore model, which articulated the independent cogni-
tive features of the author that are not attributed to prior know-
ledge.141 In the context of copyright law, these theories have impli-
cations on the romantic author discourse and on the originality re-
quirement.142 Later sections show that the division to two main 
sub-processes is also compatible with other theories of creativity. 
C. Creativity as Problem Solving 
One of the most significant theories on the process of creation 
posits that it is a problem-solving process.143 However, in contrast 
to classical problem solving, where the goal is known but the paths 
to the solution are not, this theory holds that the creative process is 
characterized by ill-defined goals and problems.144 Further, al-
                                                                                                                            
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). But see id. § 102(b). 
139 See § 103. But see § 102(b). 
140 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 315; Gabora, supra note 111, at 9; Suler, supra note 
106, at 146. 
141 See generally FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121. 
142 See infra Section V.B. 
143 See Kozbelt, Beghetto & Runco, supra note 34, at 33. 
144 See id. (defining creativity as an ill-defined problem-solving process); Lubart, supra 
note 12, at 297 (stating that the term “problem” in the creative context also refers to a 
task that the author wishes to engage in); see also JACOB W. GETZELS & MIHALY 
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, THE CREATIVE VISION: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF PROBLEM 
FINDING IN ART 84 (1976); David Collins, A Synthesis Process Model of Creative Thinking in 
Music Composition, 33 PSYCHOL. MUSIC 193, 195 (2005); Yingxu Wang, On Cognitive 
Foundations of Creativity and the Cognitive Process of Creation, 3 INT’L J. COGNITIVE 
INFORMATICS & NAT. INTELLIGENCE 1, 2 (2009) [hereafter Wang, Cognitive Foundations]; 
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though there may be cases in which there is no problem at all, it is 
usually possible to split ill-defined problems into well-defined sub-
problems in a way that fits the classical model of problem-solving 
theory.145 Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco also noted that these ap-
proaches focus both on the creative process and the author—the 
former because these approaches deal with common cognitive psy-
chology approaches that refer to the representation of problem and 
heuristic searching, and the latter by emphasizing the expertise that 
is required from the author in the specific task-domain.146 
Guilford suggested one of the first models of creative problem 
solving.147 His model was based on several main recursive stages 
that are connected with intermediary processes that affect the 
problem-solving process.148 The first stage Guilford proposed is the 
filtering stage, during which the author’s attention is directed to a 
specific input.149 The next stage is cognition, in which the author 
recognizes the problem and defines it.150 At this stage, the author’s 
cognition is open to receiving additional inputs from the environ-
ment.151 The following stage is production, in which potential solu-
tions to the problem are produced.152 Then, another cycle of the 
cognition and production stages appears; new knowledge is ga-
thered and additional potential solutions are created.153 This cycle 
ends when a potential solution is compatible with the problem.154 In 
between each of these stages, there is an intermediate stage of 
evaluation where the author checks the validity of the input, the 
potential solutions, and the problem structure.155 The foundation of 
the entire process is the author’s stored memory, which feeds 
                                                                                                                            
Yingxu Wang & Vincent Chiew, On the Cognitive Process of Human Problem Solving, 11 
COGNITIVE SYS. RES. 81, 85 (2010). 
145 See Kozbelt, Beghetto & Runco, supra note 34, at 33. 
146 See id. 
147 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 313–16. 
148 See id. at 315. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
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312          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:287 
 
every one of the different stages.156 Importantly, when Guilford 
discussed stored memory, he referred to different types of informa-
tion, such as visual-figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral.157 
Philip Johnson-Laird, a psychologist professor and researcher 
focusing, among other things, on the creative process, proposed 
another model for creativity which fits the problem-solving and ex-
pertise category.158 He theorized that five assumptions underlie the 
creative process: (1) the outcome of the process must be innovative 
for the author; (2) the outcome of the process may be innovative 
for society, but the author’s mental process will be the same even if 
another author has already reached the same outcome; (3) presum-
ably, the creative products are unknown in advance; (4) creativity 
adheres to preexisting constraints and conventions, whether exter-
nal or internal to the author, and the author does not function as a 
closed system but is affected by existing aesthetic values; (5) works 
of authorship are not composed of “nothing;” rather, they are 
founded on preexisting grounds that function as raw material even 
for the most original works.159 
The problem-solving and expertise approach to creativity is 
supported by a wealth of empirical and historical studies. Experi-
mental research demystified some of the cognitive processes un-
derling creative innovation by showing that prior failed solution 
attempts leads to proper problem representation and heuristic 
learning that is crucial to creativity.160 In addition, historical studies 
based on personal manuscripts of important artists have also shown 
that expertise plays an integral role in the creative process. Ameri-
can cognitive psychologist John R. Hayes, for example, studied five 
hundred works of seventy-six great composers and found that only 
three were composed before the tenth year of the composer’s ca-
reer.161 As a result, some scholars have postulated that there is a 
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158 See Philip N. Johnson-Laird, How Jazz Musicians Improvise, 19 MUSIC PERCEPTION 
415, 419–20 (2002). 
159 See id. 
160 See Kozbelt, Beghetto & Runco, supra note 34, at 33. 
161 See John R. Hayes. Cognitive Processes in Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 
1989, supra note 31, at 139; see also Robert W. Weisberg, Creativity and Knowledge: A 
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“10-year rule,” requiring at least ten years of experience to create 
masterpieces.162 Other significant experiments have shown how 
artists and scientists explicitly utilize previous works to improve 
their creative skills.163 
The creative problem-solving and expertise approaches best il-
lustrate the importance of task-relevant knowledge to the creative 
process and the significance of prior knowledge and memory to in-
novation. These approaches—mainly Guilford’s—explain that the 
use of prior knowledge and memory applied to various types of in-
formation also include concrete and material types of knowledge 
and not only ideas, processes, or methods.164 In this sense, it in-
cludes expression (in copyright terms) as an information type that 
is at the basis of creativity. Part III uses the historical research that 
verifies these theories to demonstrate the importance of knowledge 
and memory in creativity. In addition, the Part shows that these 
approaches fit the general division of the creative process into two 
sub-processes. However, it is important to note that the creative 
problem-solving approaches were criticized for two reasons: their 
inability to explain how authors identify problems at the beginning 
of the creative process; and their significant focus on expertise and 
prior knowledge as the only source of creativity.165 This difficulty is 
especially relevant to creative activities in which the problem is ill-
defined or does not exist because the activation of a heuristic me-
chanism in the problem-domain cannot account for the first stage 
of creativity.166 The problem-finding approach to creativity com-
pletes this gap. 
                                                                                                                            
162 See Weisberg, supra note 161. The “10-year rule” suggested by Hayes was criticized 
because it does not account for different fields of creativity. See id. 231–232. Nevertheless, 
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the distinction in copyright and patent laws. 
164 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 315. 
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D. Creativity as Problem Finding 
The problem-finding approach was proposed primarily as a 
reaction to the problem-solving approach to creativity and its 
shortcoming in explaining how authors identify problems and in-
itiate the required motivation to engage in problem solving.167 The 
problem-finding approach is attributed first and foremost to Jacob 
Getzels and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, two leading and 
groundbreaking creativity researchers who pointed out the impor-
tance of theorizing the problem-finding stage of creativity in 
1976.168 They argued that problem finding is a crucial first step to 
problem solving, and that is it not necessarily separated from the 
solution itself.169 To test this hypothesis, they observed thirty-one 
art students performing an open task that required them to draw a 
set of objects provided by the researchers.170 The study suggested 
that the openness of an author to a problem, and his investigative 
behavior while creating and adjusting the structure and content of 
the preliminary problem, indicate that the author is engaged in 
problem finding while searching for a solution for the first identi-
fied problem.171 
However, Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco emphasized that the 
problem-finding approach, which was much more subjective, was 
not sufficiently validated through empirical research.172 They ar-
gued that the research, which attempted to explain this approach, 
empirically could be better conceptualized under problem-solving 
models.173 Thus, they argued that the distinction between both ap-
proaches is explained by scholars’ differing emphasis and goals, 
rather than by the substantive differences in the two scholars’ 
theories.174 For example, if one is interested in the subjective moti-
vation of authors, he would focus on the problem-finding approach; 
whereas, if one wishes to focus on the cognitive processes that 
                                                                                                                            
167 See id. at 34. 
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169 See id. at 84. 
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cause the creation of new ideas, he would focus on the problem-
solving approach. 
The problem-finding approach is a complementary stage to the 
problem-solving approach in the sense that it accounts for the indi-
vidual contribution of the author within the process of creation, 
when the problem-solving approach does not. If the two approach-
es are understood as two components of the same creative process, 
they are compatible with the description of the creative process as a 
two-phase process of unfocused and focused cognitive activity. In 
the legal context, the problem-finding approach emphasizes the 
independent contribution of the author to the creative product and 
conflicts with the post-modern approaches that diminished the au-
thor’s role in the creative process. 
III. CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE UNFOCUSED THOUGHT—
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY 
In spite of the differences between the various theories that 
seek to explain the cognitive process of creation, they all share gen-
eral characteristics that have important implications for copyright 
law in general and, specifically, for the right to make derivative 
works. This Part argues that all the approaches include a division of 
the creative process into two main sub-processes. Thus, it is possi-
ble to characterize the creative process as follows: At the first 
stage, the author engages in unfocused thought where she has sig-
nificant individual contribution to the process; and, at the second 
stage, the unfocused thought is crystallized into a concrete creative 
product in a way that is mainly dictated by prior task-relevant 
knowledge and memory stored in the author’s brain. Each of these 
processes has implications for copyright law. 
A. Unfocused Thought—Associative Thought and Abstract Ideas 
The first characteristic all approaches to creativity have in 
common is that they refer to a phase of unfocused attention during 
which abstract ideas of the creative activity are formed. For exam-
ple, in Wallas’ stage theory, the incubation stage is characterized 
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by unfocused associative thought.175 Similarly, the response genera-
tion stage in Amabile’s model is characterized by abstract cognitive 
processes, which are driven by highly abstract creative-relevant 
skills.176 Runco and Chand also refer to this creative phase in their 
idea presentation stage, which is described by unfocused creative 
thinking.177 
Further, the unfocused thought phase is explicitly mentioned in 
some of the creative cognition approaches. Guilford, for example, 
referred to it as part of the divergent thinking process, which he 
described as unfocused and associative.178 Similarly, Suler referred 
to the primary thought process as a metaphorical phase in which 
memories are not separated from one another.179 Gabora’s model 
offered a biological description of the unfocused phase of creativity 
when she described the formation of “neurds” during unfocused 
stimulation of neuron groups, which import relevant memory and 
knowledge into the focused thought stage.180 
Finke, Ward, and Smith’s Geneplore model more subtly distin-
guishes between the two phases. However, significant characteris-
tics of the generation component of the model are compatible with 
the unfocused thought description. The generation component in-
cludes, for example, associative thought that is followed by new 
potential ideas.181 In addition, some characteristics of the explora-
tion component of the model are also compatible with unfocused 
thought, for instance, the metaphorical thought which the authors 
attribute to the exploration component.182 
When considering the problem-solving and problem-finding 
approaches together, it is evident that they also refer to compo-
nents that are compatible with the unfocused thought phase. For 
example, although Guilford’s model appears highly structured and 
                                                                                                                            
175 See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 86. 
176 See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 88–89, 95. 
177 See Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 245–46. 
178 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 138. 
179 See Suler, supra note 106, at 144. 
180 See Gabora, supra note 111, at 5–6, 10. 
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182 See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 24; Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 
123, at 192. 
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based on analytical phases of knowledge use, it also recognizes the 
role of illumination and intuition in the creative process.183 John-
son-Laird’s assumption that the products of the creative process 
cannot be pre-known,184 along with the notion that ill-defined prob-
lems could be split into several well-defined problems,185 illustrates 
that the problem-solving approach identifies a stage that is not sole-
ly analytic and not necessarily based on knowledge and expertise. 
Thus, these approaches also fit the unfocused thought phase of 
creativity and the problem-finding approach. 
The discussion thus far shows that the predominant approach-
es to the cognitive process of creativity systematically identify stag-
es and components in which unfocused thought occurs and pro-
duces preliminary abstract ideas at the early stages of the creative 
process. However, for the purpose of this Article, the more rele-
vant stage of creativity is the phase in which the abstract ideas are 
crystallized into a socially valuable concrete product. The next Sec-
tion discusses how each of these theories identifies stages of crys-
tallization of ideas using task-relevant knowledge and memory. 
B. The Use of Task-Relevant Knowledge 
The second characteristic that all approaches to creativity share 
is reliance on preexisting task-relevant knowledge and memory in 
different stages of the creative process. One example is found in 
Wallas’ stage theory. The use of task-relevant knowledge is evident 
in two main stages: the preparation and validation stages. In the 
preparation stage, as described by Wallas, the author uses prior ex-
pertise and task-relevant knowledge to prepare for the creative 
process.186 At the validation stage, the author consciously examines 
the preliminary ideas in light of his task-relevant expertise. Know-
ledge plays a crucial role at this point as well. In fact, Wallas him-
self described the preparation and validation stages as strongly in-
terrelated.187 
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Amabile’s further developed stage model explicitly acknowl-
edged the use of task-relevant knowledge. The model defined task-
relevant skills as one of the three components of the creative 
process.188 Like the analysis suggested above with regard to Wallas’ 
theory, Amabile attributed the use of task-relevant knowledge to 
the preparation and response validation stages.189 It thus seems that 
Amabile dedicated a significant and explicit attention to the use of 
task-relevant knowledge in the creative process.190 Runco and 
Chand also explicitly acknowledged the significance of task-
relevant knowledge (which they referred to as declarative know-
ledge) as a main component that affects the problem presentation 
and ideation stages.191 
The use of task-relevant knowledge is also emphasized in the 
creative cognition approaches. Guilford’s convergent thinking in-
cluded analytical skills and the use of knowledge and memory as he 
stated explicitly.192 The secondary thought process described by 
Suler also fits the use of prior task-relevant knowledge because its 
purpose is to consciously control and form abstract ideas into con-
crete products.193 The same applies for Gabora’s honing model of 
creativity, in which the author’s memory holds the most significant 
part.194 Although Gabora identified the use of memory at the phase 
of unfocused thought, she explicitly noted that it is used in the fo-
cused thought phase when memory cells are activated along with 
the sporadic ideas created by activation of “neurds.”195 The gener-
ation process in Finke, Ward, and Smith’s Geneplore model also 
consisted of task-relevant knowledge use.196 The researchers de-
fined this process as including the restoration of knowledge and 
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memory structures and adapting them for compatibility with the 
relevant task.197 
The problem-solving approach to creativity best illustrates the 
significance and centrality of task-relevant knowledge and memory 
to the process of creation. The essence of this approach is the un-
derstanding of the creative process as a logical-analytical system to 
problem solving that is based on task-relevant expertise and pre-
vious knowledge.198 The use of prior knowledge is evident in Guil-
ford’s model, in which memory storage is used during every cogni-
tive activity throughout the creative process.199 He expressly re-
ferred to the importance of knowledge in the creative process and 
explained that it was characterized by restoring, reproducing, and 
adapting memory structures into a new product.200 Guilford also 
articulated the different types of information that are used, includ-
ing semantic, visual, and symbolic knowledge.201 Johnson-Laird’s 
approach also focused on task-relevant knowledge and the crucial 
role of memory in the process of creation. Indeed, two of his five 
assumptions about creativity concern these components: He 
pointed out that the creative process must fit predefined creative 
constraints and be based upon preexisting elements.202 In addition, 
Robert Weisberg, an American cognitive psychologist who focused 
on creativity studies and the study of geniality, demonstrated the 
importance of task-relevant knowledge and expertise in a series of 
experiments.203 
Thus, the cognitive process of creation is divided into two main 
sub-processes: (1) unfocused thought, during which abstract ideas 
form as a result of the author’s associative thought; and (2) the use 
of task-relevant knowledge and memory during focused thought for 
                                                                                                                            
197 See id., at 20; Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191–92; see also Thomas B. 
Ward & Yuliya Kolomyts, Cognition and Creativity, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
CREATIVITY, supra note 34, at 93, 93. 
198 See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 317. 
199 See id. at 315. 
200 See id. at 319. 
201 See id. 
202 See Johnson-Laird, supra note 158, at 419–20. 
203 See ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: BEYOND THE MYTH OF GENIUS 113–22 
(1993) [hereinafter WEISBERG, GENIUS]; Robert W. Weisberg, Problem Solving and 
Creativity, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 148, 148–60 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988). 
320          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:287 
 
the purpose of crystallizing preliminary abstract ideas into a con-
crete perceivable form. As noted above, the two sub-processes are 
relevant to copyright law.204 The first sub-process is relevant to the 
discussion on the independent and original contribution of the au-
thor to a creative product—copyright law’s originality require-
ment—especially in light of post-modern discourse on the roman-
tic author approach. The second sub-process is most relevant to 
the idea/expression dichotomy and the derivative work right be-
cause the use of prior knowledge is an inherent part of the creative 
process and incorporates what copyright law refers to as a deriva-
tive work. Further, the second sub-process reveals a mismatch be-
tween the law and the cognitive psychology of creativity. The next 
Part will focus on how cognitive psychologists describe the use of 
prior task-relevant knowledge and the notions that arise from these 
descriptions, which, as discussed below, have important implica-
tions for copyright law and the derivative work right. 
IV. THE USE OF TASK-RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE AND 
MEMORY IN THE CREATIVE PROCESS 
The use of task-relevant knowledge and memory are a crucial 
and inseparable part of creativity under cognitive psychology’s 
predominant approaches to creativity. Now, it is important to dis-
cuss the way task-relevant knowledge and memory are formed and 
used. To this end, this Part discusses theoretical notions about the 
use of prior knowledge that are based on empirical and historical 
studies of the cognitive process of creativity. The Part argues that 
the use of task-relevant knowledge and memory is not restricted to 
creative activities (such as ideas, processes, and methods) that are 
not afforded protection under copyright law and are therefore free 
to be used for further creative activities. Rather, task-relevant 
knowledge and memory also include concrete expressions that are 
stored in the author’s memory as part of his visual, semantic, and 
symbolic knowledge. Consequently, the use of expression as a basis 
for creative activity is not qualitatively different from the use of 
mere ideas under the cognitive understanding of the creative 
process. Both elements are an inherent part of the creative 
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process.205 This observation has significant implications for copy-
right law, especially the derivative work right. 
As emphasized in the introduction, the tension between the use 
of task-relevant knowledge and memory in the creative process and 
the derivative work right does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that authors should be deprived of an exclusive right to their 
derivative works. Nevertheless, copyright law’s distinction be-
tween ideas and expressions is not justified by the theoretical un-
derpinnings of creativity because there is a mismatch between the 
legal norm and the cognitive understanding of creativity. Accor-
dingly, the legal profession should question whether the law should 
bridge this gap and fully mirror the cognitive understanding of 
creativity. It is also important to note that it may be that the crea-
tive process is affected by external factors such as culture, econo-
my, religion, and the law. This Article does not argue that the cog-
nitive process of creation is a closed and fixed system; it argues that 
to the extent the law affects creativity, as may happen due the ex-
isting mismatch presented here, it is important to ask whether this 
effect is desired and justified. 
A. Theoretical Analysis of the Use of Knowledge and Memory 
In their work, Runco and Chand dedicated a vast discussion to 
the role of knowledge and memory in creativity.206 As for know-
ledge, they suggested a distinction between procedural and declara-
tive knowledge.207 Procedural knowledge refers to familiarity with 
strategies by which certain task-related processes could be accom-
plished (i.e., know-how).208 When an author chooses a useful strat-
egy, procedural knowledge has a significant contribution to creativ-
ity.209 In a series of studies, Runco, Chand, and their collaborators 
tested the effect of procedural knowledge on creativity.210 The re-
searchers divided participants into two groups and gave each group 
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the same task.211 One group received general guidelines about how 
to accomplish the task, while the other group received explicit di-
rections for achieving the task.212 The studies revealed not only 
that explicit directions lead to greater innovation, but also that pro-
cedural knowledge may overcome thought fixation at the ideation 
stage of creativity.213 
Declarative knowledge, on the other hand, refers to factual in-
formation stored in the author’s memory.214 Runco and Chand 
theorized that declarative knowledge contributes to the creative 
process by supplying the necessary information for the creation of 
ideas.215 Support for this theory is found in historical studies that 
show the need to acquire expertise in a field before achieving sub-
stantial creative accomplishments.216 Runco and Chand argued that 
declarative knowledge directly affects the ideation stage because an 
author with greater task-relevant expertise has a wider set of tools 
to develop preliminary ideas.217 For example, they argued that 
when a person is asked to engage in an open task that includes 
round objects, he will have an advantage if his expertise includes 
knowledge of round things, such as an astronomer who knows the 
general features of planets or a biologist who understands mole-
cules or cells.218 They also emphasized that declarative knowledge 
is mainly experience-based but could be achieved by relevant envi-
ronmental cues.219 
Additionally, Runco and Chand explained that both procedural 
and declarative knowledge are stored in long-term memory, which 
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213 See id. at 247. For the full studies, see Ivonne Chand & Mark A. Runco, Problem 
Finding Skills as Components in the Creative Process, 14 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 155 (1993); Mark A. Runco, Maximal Performance on Divergent Thinking 
Tests by Gifted, Talented, and Nongifted Children, 23 PSYCHOL. SCH. 308 (1986); M.A. 
Runco & S.M. Okuda, The Instructional Enhancement of the Flexibility and Originality 
Scores of Divergent Thinking Tests, 5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 435 (1991). 
214 See Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 246. 
215 See id. at 248. 
216 See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 161. For a discussion of additional similar studies, see 
infra Section IV.C. 
217 Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 248. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
2017] RECREATING COPYRIGHT 323 
 
can be accessed at any moment in order to engage with a task.220 
However, they noted that merely accessing procedural and declara-
tive knowledge would likely lead to an unoriginal and uncreative 
product.221 They posited that the memory in which knowledge is 
stored could be divided into two types: episodic, defined as a de-
tailed memory of an experience, and semantic, defined as a memo-
ry that contains only general characteristics of the relevant expe-
rience.222 Semantic memory is especially relevant to the creative 
process because it contains “gaps” and therefore does not allow a 
full reproduction of a relevant experience.223 Thus, semantic mem-
ory allows an author to restore parts of a specific experience and 
reconstruct other parts to engage in a relevant task.224 Runco and 
Chand argued that such reconstruction of memory is a creative ac-
tivity.225 It is important to clarify once again that declarative know-
ledge consists of concrete instances, and, in this sense, includes 
both ideas and expressions in copyright terms. The result of the 
reflection on explicit artistic expressions, as part of an experience 
that is stored in the author’s memory, while restoring it and recon-
structing it may be an example of a derivative work in the legal 
sense. 
In fact, Runco and Chand explained that creative thinking is 
memory-based.226 They relied on scholars Pat Langley and Ran-
dolph Jones, who argued that knowledge assists creativity by allow-
ing its restoration thought indexes created for each creative-
domain.227 Langley and Jones explained: 
Humans possess no general creativity factor; so no 
such component exists to be measured. Instead, 
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humans possess a wealth of knowledge structures 
indexed by concepts that a person judges as impor-
tant. The level of creativity that one exhibits will 
depend on one’s knowledge, one’s indexing 
scheme, and the particular situation in which one 
finds oneself.228 
Runco and Chand’s account of the use of prior knowledge and 
memory in the creative process is also backed by additional theoret-
ic literature. Roger Schank, an American cognitive psychologist 
who focuses on artificial intelligence and creativity, described in his 
knowledge structure model that when an author encounters a cog-
nitive input, he processes it in light of his existing knowledge struc-
tures and that input is embedded into memory in a way that allows 
future access.229 Dynamic memory, according to Schank, refines 
this process when inputs are received in the author’s memory that 
relate to existing knowledge structures or past experiences.230 
Thus, an author’s prior experiences alter the author’s knowledge 
structure.231 Accordingly, the author’s ability to understand new 
phenomena and problems in the world is based on a dynamic mem-
ory loaded with knowledge of prior experiences. When an author is 
required to engage with a task, he uses prior knowledge structures 
and experiences to detect what Schank refers to as an “explanation 
pattern” that the author used in the past.232 Schank also argued 
that the creative process is characterized by two sub-processes.233 
The first is the search for a possible explanation pattern, and the 
second is an adaptation process in which the explanation pattern is 
restored from memory and adapted so that it is compatible with the 
relevant task.234 The emphasis on the adaptation and restructuring 
as a basis for creativity is evident here as well.235 This theoretical 
                                                                                                                            
228 See id. (citing Pat Langley & Randolph Jones, A Computational Model of Scientific 
Insight, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 203, at 177, 199). 
229 See Roger C. Schank, Creativity as a Mechanical Process, in THE NATURE OF 
CREATIVITY, supra note 203, at 220, 221. 
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approach could apply to both the adaptation and restructuring of 
expressions and ideas that are part of an author’s knowledge base. 
Both types of knowledge could be part of the cognitive process of 
creativity. 
American psychologist Robert J. Sternberg also empathized the 
role of knowledge and memory in creativity in his three-facet mod-
el to creativity.236 He referred to the components of knowledge ac-
quisition in the process of creation and their effect on creative illu-
mination.237 Of the three potential causes for illumination pre-
sented, two refer to processes similar to those discussed thus far. 
One cause, according to Sternberg, is “selective combination,” in 
which illumination is created due to a synthesis between separate 
pieces of stored information.238 The ability to perform such a 
process depends on the author’s prior knowledge—the wider the 
knowledge pool, the greater variety of combinations.  
Additionally, Sternberg referred to “selective comparison,” 
which compares new information to preexisting knowledge and its 
characteristics to understand and use the new information.239 He 
argued that problem solving by analogy is one example of this cause 
of illumination.240 Paul J. Locher, a professor of experimental psy-
chology, reached similar conclusions.241 He reviewed empirical and 
historical studies on the process of creation, such as brain imaging, 
X-ray studies of artworks, and archival studies on the creation of 
historical masterpieces in real time.242 Based on these studies, 
Locher argued that the use of procedural and declarative know-
ledge is essential and central to all stages of the creative process.243 
Sternberg’s emphasis on the importance of synthesis between ex-
isting knowledge components in the process of creation, along with 
Locher’s focus on the importance of declarative knowledge (which 
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includes both ideas and expression) to the creative process support 
the argument that no qualitative distinction between ideas and ex-
pressions exists. 
B. Empirical Studies on Creativity 
American creativity researchers Wayne Baughman and Michael 
Mumford assumed in their studies that merely restoring an applica-
tion of prior experiences and knowledge by the author is not likely 
to lead to creativity.244 However, they argued that combining and 
restructuring existing knowledge is a good mechanism for idea-
tion.245 This argument was based on several studies showing that 
creative development in many fields requires the combination and 
restructuring of existing knowledge.246 They referred to the re-
search of Michele Mobley (and his co-authors), who argued that it 
is impossible to create something from nothing and that a genera-
tion of new ideas has to be based on existing knowledge struc-
tures.247 Mobley hypothesized that if authors are asked to combine 
diverse categories, their creative products will be more original.248 
To test this theory, 160 participants were asked to work with ex-
emplars of various categories, to combine them in order to create 
new categories, and to suggest new exemplars for the new catego-
ries and write a story that describes them.249 They found more ori-
ginality when participants combined more distant categories, but 
the results also demonstrated that the quality of the products de-
clined when participants worked with distant categories, which was 
likely due to difficulties that arose when working with unknown 
categories.250 
                                                                                                                            
244 See Wayne A. Baughman & Michael D. Mumford, Process-Analytic Models of Creative 
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247 See id. at 39 (citing Michele I. Mobley et al., Process Analytic Models of Creative 
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249 See id. at 39–40 (citing Mobley et al., supra note 247). 
250 See id. at 40 (citing Mobley et al., supra note 247). 
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Following Mobley, Baughman and Mumford conducted the fol-
lowing study: 155 participants were given exemplars of undefined 
categories.251 They were first asked to identify each category ac-
cording to the exemplars provided.252 They were then asked to 
create a category that united all the categories mapped by them and 
to find an exemplar for the united category.253 Finally, the partici-
pants were asked to define the new category and to find more ex-
emplars for it.254 Analyzing the findings, Baughman and Mumford 
concluded that, under some conditions, tasks involving the combi-
nation of categories lead to better and more original creative prod-
ucts.255 In addition, they noted that the process of combination and 
reorganization is executed by searching for the characteristics of 
each category and mapping them, and that only a combination of 
the two would lead to greater originality.256 
Finke, Ward, and Smith conducted a line of similar studies fo-
cusing on a combination and reorganization of the categories and 
the importance of exemplars.257 They focused on the effects that 
categories and known perceptions have on the creative process.258 
This was based on the perception that new ideas, as creative as 
they may be, are usually developed as limited expansions of exist-
ing perceptions.259 Their first study, conducted in 1994, consisted 
of five experiments.260 In the first experiment, thirty-seven partici-
pants were asked to draw an animal they may encounter on a dif-
ferent planet, another animal from the same species, and an animal 
from the same planet but from a different species.261 The results 
showed that the vast majority of animals drawn had earthy features 
(bilateral symmetry, sensory organs, limbs, etc.), which shows that 
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when an author is asked to create an exemplar for a known catego-
ry, his work will be highly structured.262  
In their second experiment, 180 participants were asked to 
draw an animal residing on a different planet that is completely dif-
ferent than earth.263 The participants were divided into four 
groups; one group did not receive any guidance, and the other 
group was instructed that the animal had either feathers, fur, or 
lives underwater.264 This experiment also indicated that there is 
significant use of prior knowledge of the characteristics of a catego-
ry in the process of finding a new exemplar for the category.265 
That is why participants in the feathers group tended to draw 
winged animals, and participants in the underwater group tended 
to draw animals with fins.266 Similarly, participants in the fur and 
feather groups tended to draw animals with two feet and partici-
pants in the feathers group tended to draw animals with a beak.267 
Three additional experiments also produced results showing that 
participants usually restore known exemplars of earthy animals 
when asked to draw imaginary animals.268 
Based on these findings, Finke, Ward, and Smith proposed the 
term “structured imagination” to describe an author’s tendency to 
create new ideas while preserving existing categories and noted: 
“Imagination is structured or directed by knowledge of the catego-
ry or categories most related to the individual’s goals.”269 Later, 
Finke, Ward, and Smith explained that the use of knowledge in this 
context refers to both long-tem memory and to knowledge gathered 
during engagement with the relevant task.270 To describe the 
process in which the author uses preexisting knowledge structures, 
Finke, Ward, and Smith proposed the “path of least resistance” 
                                                                                                                            
262 See id. at 8–11. 
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model.271 They postulated that when an author imagines a new ent-
ity, she first determines the task-relevant knowledge-domain, and 
then accesses the existing knowledge in that domain to construct a 
new entity.272  
Thomas Ward, a cognition and creativity researcher, and Yu-
liya Kolomyts, a language researcher, both of the University of Al-
abama, expanded this model and noted that when authors develop 
new ideas in a specific domain, their first inclination is to access 
specific exemplars from this domain as a starting point, retrieve 
characteristics from these exemplars, and then import them into 
developing ideas.273 This is based on empirical findings of Ward 
and his followers, which suggested that to develop an exemplar for 
a new domain, authors develop products that are substantially simi-
lar to exemplars of existing domains.274 It is likely that this tenden-
cy is an inherent part of structured imagination.275 Notably, Ward 
theorized that the probability of innovative creativity is higher 
when the author uses larger systems of knowledge instead of mere 
exemplars.276 However, Ward and Kolomyts emphasized that, 
while using more abstract ideas would probably lead to more crea-
tivity, it would come at the expense of compatibility and usability of 
the creative products and thus diminish their value.277 Therefore, it 
should be expected that the “constraining” effect that reliance on 
prior knowledge and exemplars has on innovation is necessary to 
reach meaningful and valuable creative products.278 
The studies discussed in this Article thus far focus on creative 
thought, generally, and all fields of creative activity—not only 
those to which copyright law applies.279 There are very few empiri-
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cal studies that focus directly on artworks and other works of au-
thorship. Nevertheless, there are numerous studies relevant to this 
Article’s discussion that examine the process of making works of 
art. Japanese cognitive psychologists Sawako Yokochi and Takeshi 
Okada attempted to empirically test different theoretical approach-
es to creativity by studying the process of creating artworks.280 For 
this purpose, they observed Chinese Suibokuga, a traditional pain-
ter in his sixties with twenty years of experience, for a three-year 
period.281 The painter was asked to draw eight paintings on an 
empty canvas and eight additional paintings on a canvas containing 
fifteen random lines drawn by two other participants.282 Yokochi 
and Okada identified two important characteristics in these studies: 
First, when the painter worked with the empty canvas, he used the 
same painting strategy every time.283 Second, when the painter 
worked with predetermined random lines, his paintings were less 
accurate in their composition but much more original in their 
style.284 This observation was corroborated by interviews with the 
painter after the study.285 The researchers concluded, based on this 
findings, that the approach of Finke, Ward, and Smith was accurate 
and that combining preexisting knowledge structures containing 
components from past experiences contributes significantly to in-
novation.286 
Another qualitative study conducted by cognitive psychologists 
Mary-Anne Mace and Tony Ward attempted to develop a model 
for the creative process behind artworks.287 They conducted semi-
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structured interviews with authors during the creative process.288 
At the first stage, sixteen visual artists were interviewed at three 
different times during their creative process—first, at the begin-
ning of the process, second, in the middle of the it, and third at the 
end of the process.289 The participants were asked to describe their 
creative process at the relevant stage of the interview and to refrain 
from reporting general theories about the creative process.290 After 
analyzing the findings, the researchers proposed a detailed model 
for the creation of artworks based on the interviews.291 According 
to Mace and Ward, the creation of a work of art does not develop 
out of a conceptual void; rather, it is a product of thought and on-
going experience.292 They argued that the author obtains a vast 
knowledge base of the creative process over time, explicitly and 
implicitly understanding techniques, skills, genres, theories, aes-
thetics, prior works, and art in its contemporary and historical 
sense.293 This knowledge develops along with the process of crea-
tion, and the author refers to it at every stage of the process.294 
They later verified the results of this study.295 It is important to 
note that Mace and Ward explicitly emphasized that the creative 
process is also based on explicit knowledge of prior works that the 
author refers to during the process.296 They also stressed that this 
aspect links the process of creating a current work with previous 
and future works in the same domain.297 In this sense, it is clear 
that the process of creation includes the use of expressions as well 
as ideas.298 
In the past three decades, the number of quantitative empirical 
studies of creativity using methodologies and instruments from 
neurosciences has grown tremendously. The two main methodolo-
gies in this field are the use of functional magnetic resonance imag-
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ing (“fMRI”) and an electroencephalogram (“EEG”).299 One ex-
ample of such a study was American cognitive psychologist Robert 
L. Solso, who examined the creative process in real-time using 
fMRI.300 Solso measured the brain activity of British portrait artist 
Humphrey Ocean while he drew portraits of figures that were pre-
sented to him, and compared it to the brain activity of another ama-
teur participant performing the same task.301 The two participants 
were asked to draw the faces of presented figures for thirty seconds 
while undergoing fMRI.302 
The results of the study showed excessive activity in the right-
rear part of the amateur participant’s brain when compared to 
Ocean’s.303 According to Solso, this showed that Ocean’s expe-
rience and expertise in face-detection and understanding may have 
led to less effort in the parts of the brain charged with face-
detection.304 The more interesting result, however, was that 
Ocean’s brain showed excessive activity in the front-central part of 
the right lobe, which is in charge of associative thinking and mani-
pulation of visual structures.305 According to Solso, this indicated 
that, while the amateur participant reproduced the figures pre-
sented to him, Ocean thought about them and associatively 
adapted them.306 
In a different fMRI study conducted by cognition and brain 
scientist Melissa Ellamil (and her co-authors), fifteen visual art 
students were presented with short book descriptions and asked to 
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draw illustrations for each book’s cover on a tablet computer con-
nected to fMRI.307 Later, they were asked to review their illustra-
tions and evaluate them.308 The researchers noted that at the pro-
duction stage of the illustrations, excessive brain action occurred in 
the medial temporal lobe, which is in charge of the processing of 
semantic memory and recombination of memory using associa-
tions.309 The researchers explained that this finding fits theoretical 
approaches that focus on associative processing and recombination 
of existing knowledge as the basis for creativity.310 
Studies using the EEG methodology have also validated some 
of the theoretical approaches to creativity concerning the use of 
task-relevant knowledge and memory.311 Austrian cognitive psy-
chologists Andreas Fink and Mathias Benedek reviewed many 
EEG studies that focused on creativity.312 Among other findings, 
they concluded that all studies showed changes in alpha power in 
the author’s brain cortex during creative activity.313 One of the 
consistent changes that Fink and Benedek identified was an in-
crease in alpha power in the rear part of the parietal lobe of the 
brain cortex.314 They surmised that because this part of the brain is 
in charge of memory, the increase in alpha power should be unders-
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tood as an attempt to search and restore memory in order to use 
and recombine knowledge for the creative process.315 
Despite the differences in the various neuroscientific studies of 
creativity, many researchers reached similar conclusions about the 
use of task-relevant knowledge and memory in the creative process. 
American creativity researcher Keith Sawyer, for example, re-
viewed the studies published in this field between October 2010 
and May 2011.316 Although he urged psychologists to think critical-
ly about the use of neuroscience in creativity studies and to under-
stand the shortcomings, he nevertheless concluded that there are a 
number of areas where the results are undisputed.317 For instance, 
he emphasized that associative thinking—the recombination of 
preexisting knowledge and task-relevant expertise—is an undis-
puted part of creativity.318 In a different literature review, cognitive 
psychologists Sureyya Yoruk and Mark Runco examined fMRI and 
EEG studies conducted from 2004 to 2014.319 They concluded that 
creativity is characterized by excessive brain activity in the left part 
of the brain, specifically in the lower parietal lobe, which is in 
charge of storing semantic memory.320 In addition, they argued that 
these areas of the brain are in charge of creating preliminary associ-
ations that function as a step toward more distant associations that 
develop in the right hemisphere of the brain where EEG studies 
show excessive alpha power.321 Therefore, they concluded that 
creativity is characterized by the processing and recombination of 
semantic memory and task-relevant knowledge contained within 
such processing.322 
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C. Historical Studies 
One of the methodologies used in creativity studies is archival 
research, which examines the creation of works of art by reviewing 
the personal documents made by artists while they created master-
pieces.323 This Section focuses on the studies conducted by Robert 
Weisberg, a cognitive psychologist focusing on creativity, geniality, 
and expertise who shed light on the importance of expertise and 
task-relevant knowledge to the creative process from a historical 
perspective. 
Weisberg’s first two case studies are from the field of visual 
arts, specifically, masterpieces of Pablo Picasso.324 The first work is 
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon published in 1907.325 Weisberg analyzed 
the creative process of this work by comparing X-ray images of the 
final product to sketches preserved by Picasso.326 Weisberg de-
scribed the various stages in Picasso’s work as well as the parts in 
which Picasso used prior works.327 However, the most important 
observation for this Article’s purposes is the identification of ex-
ternal sources of Picasso’s work.328 Weisberg learned that the nude 
female figures in Picasso’s work were based on and adapted from 
figures included in other painters’ masterpieces.329 For example, 
the kneeling female in the bottom-right part of Picasso’s painting is 
very similar to the female in Paul Cezanne’s work entitled The 
Three Bathers.330 In addition, the two central female figures in Pi-
casso’s work are similar to the two women who appear in Goya’s 
Nuda Maja and Manet’s Olympia.331 The general composition of 
Picasso’s work is drawn from his colleague Henri Matisse’s work, 
Le Bonheur de Vivre.332 
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Weisberg conducted similar research regarding Picasso’s mas-
terpiece Guernica.333 He explained that this work is substantially 
based on previous works of Picasso.334 But, more importantly, 
Weisberg also noted that Guernica, which referred to the atrocities 
of the Spanish civil war, was substantially based on Goya’s series of 
sketches entitled The Disasters of War from 1816.335 Weisberg em-
phasized that several figures and positions presented in Goya’s 
sketches appear, after stylistic adaptations, in Picasso’s Guerni-
ca.336 
Weisberg found similar findings in musical compositions.337 He 
studied many of the early works of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and 
found significant reliance on other composers’ works.338 For in-
stance, Mozart’s first four piano concerti (K. 37, 29, 40, 41) did not 
contain any original music—they were adapted from the works of 
five other composers.339 In addition, Mozart’s three consecutive 
piano concerti (K. 107 nos. 1–3) composed in 1772 were actually 
the works of Johann Christian Bach (Johan Sebastian Bach’s 
younger son) and were rearranged and orchestrated by Mozart.340 
A similar pattern was identified in Mozart’s first symphonies and 
chamber compositions, which were stylized according to pre-
classical styles and based on the compositions of young Bach and 
other German composers.341 Likewise, Weisberg found reliance on 
prior works in Mozart’s later compositions.342 He argued that the 
finale of Mozart’s Jupiter symphony—the last that Mozart com-
posed—was based on five themes that were drawn from other 
composers’ work.343 Similarly, Mozart’s three E-flat horn concerti 
was substantially based on Antoni Rosetti’s horn concerti from the 
same period.344 
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Weisberg divided his studies into two categories of creativity. 
He described the first as reproductive creativity.345 The category 
includes the Guernica, the structure of which Picasso based on his 
previous works.346 Weisberg noted that these cases show this type 
of creativity occurs through the reproduction of prior knowledge 
without modifying its form and by adapting it to fit new needs 
through analogical transfer.347 Weisberg described the second type 
of creativity as reproductive restructuring.348 An example of this is 
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, which is speculated to have 
been substantially restructured after Picasso visited an ethnograph-
ic museum and encountered primitive sculpture.349 Weisberg in-
ferred from these case studies that every work is linked to prior 
work and that every work has a preceding work, as the past is a cru-
cial basis for innovation.350 In light of these observations, Weisberg 
proposed a model that explains the use of task-relevant knowledge 
in creativity.351 In contrast to the notion that creativity begins with 
the reception of input from the environment that is later processed 
according to stored knowledge (bottom-up model), he contended 
that task-relevant knowledge forms the perception of input from 
the environment (top-down model).352 Thus, when a person identi-
fies a new event in the environment, the mere identification is go-
verned by the preexisting task-relevant knowledge already stored in 
his memory, which further evidences task-relevant knowledge’s 
critical contribution to creativity.353 
The studies presented in this Part—theoretical, empirical, and 
historical—all point to the same conclusion: They all focus, in one 
way or another, on the significant role task-relevant knowledge and 
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memory have in the cognitive process of creation and describe in 
different ways how these components are used by the author. 
These studies all show that the creative process includes the use of 
existing knowledge structures inherently and in a concrete way that 
is identifiable in different stages of the process and its outcomes. 
The use of knowledge structures is not limited to ideas (in copy-
right terms); it also includes the explicit use of expressions. Under 
this reading of the cognitive psychology literature on creativity, 
there is no qualitative difference between creative activities based 
upon ideas and those based on explicit expressions. The products 
of both are considered creative under these approaches. This is the 
main notion that this Article tries to extract from the cognitive psy-
chology discourse on creativity. The next Part explains how this 
notion can be applied to copyright law and what implications it may 
have on different copyright doctrines. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW 
After establishing the notion that the creative process is charac-
terized by two main processes—one of unfocused thought and 
generation of abstract ideas and the other of focused thought and 
crystallization of abstract ideas—and showing that the use of know-
ledge and memory (not limited to ideas but also to explicit expres-
sions) is an inherent part of the creative process, this Part points 
out the implications of these notions on some aspects of copyright 
law and examines to what extent the legal doctrine matches the 
cognitive understanding of creativity. The Part argues that this no-
tion has significant implications for copyright law’s originality re-
quirement, derivative work right, and idea/expression dichotomy. 
A. The Use of Prior Knowledge in the Creative Process and Copyright’s 
Originality Requirement 
The originality requirement is at the heart of copyright and 
aims to ensure that non-original works do not receive copyright 
protection.354 The originality requirement is part of copyright’s 
statutory requirements in many jurisdictions but “originality” is 
                                                                                                                            
354 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
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not statutorily defined.355 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act 
states that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works . . . .”356 Courts in many jurisdictions have 
struggled with defining the exact meaning of originality for copy-
right purposes. In the notorious Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel-
ephone Service Co. case, the Supreme Court ruled that in order to 
prove originality for copyright purposes, a work should be an inde-
pendent creation of the author and should be somewhat creative.357 
The ruling did not end the debate on the meaning of originality and 
creativity in copyright law.358 Without delving into the various ap-
proaches to creativity and originality in copyright law, it seems that 
one definition is not in dispute—for a work or any part of it to be 
original, it must be the author’s independent creation.359 
If originality, in its undisputed meaning, is the sine qua non for 
copyright protection, the importance of reliance on prior know-
ledge and memory in the process of creation has significant impli-
cations for the requirement. If this Article’s argument is correct, it 
is likely that every author’s work is based on components (includ-
ing expressions) from other authors’ works. Further, if an author’s 
work is based on another author’s expression, then it may, under 
certain circumstances, be a derivative work.360 Conversely, if a 
work is based on ideas or unprotected expression, then it is an 
“original work.”361 As a result, many works of authorship are not 
copyrightable and remain in the public domain.  Courts sometimes 
indeed distinguish between different components of a work that are 
                                                                                                                            
355 See id. § 101. 
356 See § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
357 See 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“[O]riginality requires independent creation plus a 
modicum of creativity.”). 
358 For a review of the case’s influence on other jurisdictions and the creative choice 
test for originality, see Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949 (2002), and 
Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of 
Originality in Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 375 (2009), which examines 
the reception of the creative choice test in different jurisdictions. 
359 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
360 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(b), 106 (2012). 
361 See id. § 102(a). 
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copyrightable and those that are not.362 Nevertheless, the discourse 
in copyright law and specifically in court decisions is about the co-
pyrightabilty of a work as a whole.363 The notions in this Article 
indicate that this may not be the right question to ask and that 
courts should instead ask what components of the work are copy-
rightable. 
This Article emphasizes the mismatch between the legal doc-
trine and the cognitive understanding of creativity. In the context 
of the originality requirement, there is a match as far as the prin-
ciples of the doctrine are considered but a mismatch as to its appli-
cation in courts. The few doubts raised here articulate the potential 
contribution that notions from cognitive psychology of creativity 
may have for copyright law. 
B. The Creative Process and the Author’s Independent Contribution 
Commentators such as James Boyle, Jessica Litman, and R. 
Keith Sawyer argue that copyright law perceives creativity from a 
“romantic” point of view attributed to the western world.364 This 
romantic point of view understands creativity as a moment of reve-
lation in which a work is created from nothing—a light bulb mo-
ment—and portrays the author as an independent individual work-
ing in the dark until the awaited breakthrough.365 
                                                                                                                            
362 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating 
that the question of whether the originality requirement should be tested for each 
component of the work is usually discussed in an infringement analysis and specifically in 
computer software cases). The common test is the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. 
At the first stage, the work is abstracted to its components. At the second stage, each 
component is scrutinized using the idea/expression dichotomy and other copyright 
doctrines that deny liability for infringement. At the third stage, the protected 
components are compared to the allegedly infringing ones. Courts differ as to whether the 
second stage refers to copyrightability in general or only as a defense against an 
infringement action. It may be that the notions from cognitive psychology support the 
application of the second stage in the copyrightability part of the analysis regarding any 
type of work, not only computer software. 
363 See supra note 362. 
364 See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. 
U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1987); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 965 
(1990); R. Keith Sawyer, The Western Cultural Model of Creativity: Its Influence on 
Intellectual Property Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2027, 2033 (2011). 
365 See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 140 (2013). 
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Many scholars criticize the romantic approach to creativity. 
The first stage of the criticism relied on the common notion that no 
work could be created out of nothing and that it is obvious that one 
needs to rely on prior knowledge to innovate.366 This notion was so 
obvious to critical scholars that some of them referred to it as a 
cliché.367 Kwall suggested, however, that in spite of the fact that 
every work is based on previous knowledge, the individual contri-
bution of the author to new work still justifies copyright protec-
tion.368 Nevertheless, it seems that the romantic approach to au-
thorship has lost credit, at least in academic scholarship for the last 
two decades. It also seems that this intuitive notion is becoming 
more substantial as knowledge becomes more and more available 
and technological advancements make it more accessible and usa-
ble for further innovation.369 
In their important and constitutive book, which was the first to 
offer an alternative to the romantic author approach to copyright 
law, Martha Woodmansee, a professor of English literature, and 
Peter Jaszi, an acclaimed copyright scholar, showed that the legal 
norms in copyright law are a product of the romantic author ap-
proach and are not compatible with the social understanding of 
creativity.370 Woodmansee showed that the romantic author ap-
proach is a product of the eighteenth century and is a short episode 
in comparison to the documented history of creativity in earlier 
centuries, and that, in the past, the creative process was perceived 
as a social action that is not attributed to one individual.371 On the 
                                                                                                                            
366 See S.C. GILFILLAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF INVENTION 77–78 (1935); Paul Goldstein, 
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 
218 (1983); Andrew Hargadon & Robert I. Sutton, Building an Innovation Factory, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May–June 2000, at 157, 158–59. 
367 See Litman, supra note 364, at 966. 
368 See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL 
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 2 (2010). 
369 See, e.g., Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 
1214 (1997). 
370 See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
371 See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectively, in THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE, 
supra note 370, at 15; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and 
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 
426 (1984). 
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basis of these notions, Jaszi argued that the influence of the roman-
tic author approach on copyright law led to a gap between the so-
cial understanding of creativity and the legal one, which makes it 
difficult for copyright law to adapt and govern more complex mod-
els of creativity and specifically multiple-authorship works.372 
The notions from the cognitive psychology of creativity as pre-
sented in this Article show that this understanding of creativity 
leads to a somewhat different conclusion. Although the cognitive 
process of creation is characterized by substantial reliance on prior 
task-relevant knowledge and memory, an inseparable part of crea-
tivity has to do with the unfocused thought of the author and cogni-
tive processes that are original to him.373 Therefore, it seems that 
the creative process is not a romantic individual process in the 
sense that the author is the sole origin of the work, but, on the oth-
er hand, it is not based solely on prior knowledge and works. In 
fact, there is a significant match between copyright’s originality 
requirement and the cognitive understanding of creativity that arti-
culates the author’s original contribution. These notions could be 
the basis for further discussion of the place of the individual author 
in the process of creation and in copyright law. 
One example of the implications of such a discussion is the 
joint authorship doctrine in copyright law. Section 201(a) of the 
Copyright Act states that “[t]he authors of a joint work are co-
owners of copyright in the work.”374 A “joint work” is defined as 
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.”375 One of the most debated aspects about 
this doctrine revolves around what contribution to a joint work is 
considered authorship. The two main positions were argued by 
copyright scholars Melville Nimmer, who asserted that the contri-
                                                                                                                            
372 See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE, supra note 370, at 29 [hereinafter Jaszi, Author Effect]; Peter Jaszi, Toward a 
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L. J. 455 (1991) 
[hereinafter Jaszi, Theory of Copyright]. 
373 See Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 372; Jaszi, Theory of Copyright, supra note 372. 
374 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
375 Id. § 101. 
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bution does not have to be copyrightable on its own,376 and Paul 
Goldstein, who argued that the contribution should be indepen-
dently copyrightable.377 
The findings from the cognitive psychology of creativity may 
offer guidance here. If the process of creation involves independent 
contribution of the author, and the process does not make a distinc-
tion between ideas and expressions, there is no reason to think that 
an independent contribution to a work of authorship—which con-
sists of ideas and is therefore not copyrightable on its own—is not a 
creative contribution that amounts to authorship. Thus, Nimmer’s 
claim that non-copyrightable contributions to a work of authorship 
could qualify as joint authorship may fit well with the understand-
ing of creativity.378 
C. The Use of Prior Knowledge and the Right to Make Derivative 
Works 
The right to make derivative works is a relatively new right in 
copyright law’s bundle of rights and was first introduced in the 
Copyright Act of 1976.379 It expanded the preexisting adaptation 
right and absorbed the case law’s expansion of the reproduction 
right.380 The derivative work right granted authors exclusive rights 
to works that are “based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
                                                                                                                            
376 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[A][3] 
(2015). Nimmer’s approach was explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit in Childress v. 
Taylor and later in the Ninth Circuit as well. Id. (citing 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
The Seventh Circuit, however, accepted Nimmer’s approach and decided that the 
contribution of ideas could be sufficient for joint authorship. See id.  
377 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.1, at 4:7 (3d ed. 2005 & 
Supp. 2007). Goldstein’s approach was followed in the Childress case and in subsequent 
cases in the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
378 For an analysis of different tests for the constitution of joint authorship that attempts 
to solve the problems with the intent requirement based on notions from creativity 
studies, see Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of 
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 357–61 (2010). Mandel 
contends that the requirement for joint authorship would be a “non-market-substitutable-
contribution.” Id. 
379 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
380 See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal 
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 224–33 (2008); Goldstein, supra 
note 366, at 211–15; Jed Rubinfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 
112 YALE L.J. 1, 49–52 (2002). 
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as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”381 With regard to the applica-
tion of the current doctrine, Nimmer argued that the right to make 
derivative works is “superfluous” because the making of a deriva-
tive work will (almost) always involve reproduction of the underly-
ing work;382 however, Professor Pamela Samuelson argued that the 
derivative work right could be understood in a different way that 
could exist independently from the reproduction right.383 On the 
normative level, however, most commentators have argued that the 
current, broad definition of the derivative work right is unjusti-
fied.384 
The derivative work right’s current definition raises significant 
questions and difficulties, which focus mainly on the tension be-
tween first and second authors, and on the constraints that the 
right casts on the development of new expressions. The difficulties 
involve two different aspects of the derivative work right. The first 
aspect is the scope of the right in light of its statutory definition. 
This aspect is substantial because it caps the borders of the legal 
discourse on derivative works and sets its start and end points and 
                                                                                                                            
381 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
382 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 376, § 8.09[A][1]. 
383 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative 
Work Right, 101 GEO. L. J. 1505 (2013). 
384 For a critique of the derivative work right based on freedom of speech, see Christina 
Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Work Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth 
and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 688 (2010); Niva Elkin-
Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 277–83 (1996); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–64 (1996); Voegtli, supra note 369, at 
1213–58. For an economic critique on the derivative work right, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Shubha 
Ghosh, Market Entry and the Proper Scope of Copyright, 12 INT’L J. ECON. & BUS. 347, 351 
(2005); Goldstein, supra note 366, at 227; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement 
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048–68 (1997); Lydia Pallas Loren, The 
Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 77–78 (2000); Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 650–53 (1996); Chris Newman, 
Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2011); Stewart 
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215–17 (1996); 
Voegtli, supra note 369, at 1241–45. 
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the number of cases to which it applies. The second aspect con-
cerns remedies for copyright infringement. This aspect determines 
the right’s strength to a great extent—that is, the stronger the re-
medies granted to the copyright holder (or the prohibition on 
whoever is not), the stronger the right, and vice versa. 
In the absence of empirical data that could offer guidance, at 
least on a utilitarian basis, as to the proper balance between first 
authors’ interests and second authors’ interests, it is possible to 
turn to findings from cognitive psychology’s account of creativi-
ty.385 Moreover, as a recent study shows, there is good reason to 
doubt whether authors are in fact rational agents that respond to 
market incentives. Based on behavioral experiments, Stephan 
Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco, and Christopher Sprigman 
showed that authors’ decision to borrow from existing works or 
create works “from scratch” is not affected by copyright law’s in-
centives, but by their subjective belief about the difficulty of inno-
vation.386 These findings emphasize the importance of understand-
ing cognitive psychology’s account of creativity and applying it to 
the law in order to create more efficient copyright doctrines. The 
notion regarding the use of prior knowledge and memory in the 
creative process and the lack of qualitative differences between 
ideas and expressions in this context warrant asking whether copy-
right law’s distinction between derivative and original works is jus-
tified. 
As far as the first aspect is concerned—the scope of the deriva-
tive work right—there is a strong link between the legal norm and 
the cognitive understanding of creativity. If, for example, it turned 
out that the scope of the derivative work right is very broad, but the 
reliance on expressions during the process of creation is marginal, 
it would raise the question of whether such a legal right is needed 
and justified. In contrast, if the scope of the derivative work right is 
narrow, vague, and applied to a limited set of cases, but the use of 
preexisting expressions is inherent to the process of creation (as 
                                                                                                                            
385 For a similar approach, see Fishman, supra note 2, at 1341, and Jeanna C. Former, A 
Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1458–59 (2010). 
386 See Stephan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 
Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND. 
L. REV. 1251, 1297 (2016). 
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this Article attempts to show), scholars should ask whether the le-
gal doctrine should better reflect the behavioral aspects of creativi-
ty. 
But, more important, due to the significance of the use of prior 
knowledge and memory in the cognitive process of creation (which 
is not limited to ideas but also includes explicit expressions), a bet-
ter understanding of the right to make derivative works is war-
ranted. The making of a derivative work is, in its nature, a creative 
activity under cognitive approaches to creativity and is not qualita-
tively different than an original work (that is not based on protected 
expressions). This observation has great importance as far as the 
scope of the derivative right and its intersection with the reproduc-
tion right are concerned. This Article argues that the reproduction 
right should apply only to mere reproductions, which are inherent-
ly uncreative and therefore qualitatively different from derivative 
or original works.387 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. As-
suming that the literary masterpiece The Catcher in the Rye388 is an 
original work that is creative under copyright law, there are three 
different alternatives for works based on this work. One alternative 
is the making of a literary work whose main character is a sixteen-
year-old teenager who runs away from home to the big city and 
reaches important notions about the life of adults during his jour-
ney. This work would probably be considered original under copy-
right law because it only uses the general underlying idea in the 
original work, and would also be considered creative under the 
cognitive approaches presented above. Another alternative is the 
making of a literary work entitled “60 Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye,” which presents the relationship between Mr. 
C. (a reference to Holden Caulfield) and the 90-year-old author 
                                                                                                                            
387 A reservation is appropriate here. There obviously are reproductive actions, in 
copyright terms, that use explicit copyrighted expressions without adding original 
expressions to them which are very creative in the cognitive behavioral sense. One 
example is the use of an expression while changing its mode of presentation or presenting 
it in a different context that gives it new meaning. These activities are typically allowed 
under the fair use doctrine. This Article does not focus on the interrelations between fair 
use and reproduction, but it seems that the fair use doctrine sufficiently accounts for the 
cognitive notions regarding the creativity of such activities. 
388 See generally J.D. SALINGER, CATCHER IN THE RYE (Little, Brown & Co. 1951). 
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who created his character and refers to specific scenes from the 
original work.389 This work would fall under the category of deriva-
tive works because it uses explicit expression from the original 
work and contributes additional originality. It would also be consi-
dered creative under the cognitive approaches that view the re-
combination of prior knowledge as part of creativity. A third alter-
native would be a literal repeat of the original work’s text while 
changing the name of the main character Holden Caulfield to 
James Sheffield. Under copyright law, this is considered a repro-
duction despite the marginal changes. In contrast to the two first 
alternatives, the third option is not considered creative under the 
cognitive approaches because it is an exact restoration of know-
ledge without any other creative components. 
This example illustrates the gap between the legal categories 
and the cognitive understanding of creativity. The cognitive psy-
chology approaches do not distinguish between knowledge types 
such as ideas or expressions as a basis for creativity. They also do 
not distinguish between the uses of different knowledge types along 
the timeline of creativity—meaning, in the input, processing, or 
output stages of creativity. Copyright law, in contrast, is interested 
almost solely in the output stage and in the final creative product. 
At many points, there is a match between the cognitive under-
standing of creativity and copyright law. Thus, as far as the use of 
any type of knowledge (ideas or expression) at the time of input 
and processing is concerned, copyright law allows such use because 
these stages of creativity are not governed. At the output stage, so 
long as the use of knowledge led to the creation of ideas or unpro-
tected expressions (whether they are in the public domain or al-
lowed under the fair use doctrine), it is generally not considered an 
infringement under copyright law as well. 
The mismatch between copyright law and the cognitive under-
standing of creativity is most strongly evident in the use of pro-
tected expressions during the output stage of creativity. When this 
occurs during a creative activity that involves an original contribu-
tion of the second author, a derivative work is sometimes made. 
                                                                                                                            
389 These were the facts that led to the decision in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
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While the law distinguishes between a derivative work and an orig-
inal work, under the cognitive understanding of creativity both are 
creative activities. In contrast, while the law makes almost no dis-
tinction between derivative works and mere reproductions, the 
cognitive approaches to creativity view derivative works as part of 
creativity but not reproductions. It so happens that while the cogni-
tive approaches to creativity views the use of prior expression in 
the output stage of creativity as an inherent part of the creative 
process, the legal doctrine sometimes prohibits this behavior and 
categorizes it as copyright infringement (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The Components of the Creative Process Under Each 
of the Theories of Creativity390 
 
Components Idea Method Fact Expression Thought Education Technical 
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Not  
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390 The + sign in this table indicates that, under the relevant stage and the relevant 
approach, the knowledge type in the specific column is being used. Empty cells indicate 
that the relevant knowledge type is not being used. 
391 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
392 See id. 
393 See id. 
394 See id. 
395 Knowledge acquired through education may sometimes be a protected expression. 
For example, a painter that studies the cubism style and acquires knowledge about the 
visual way in which Picasso expressed the minotaur figure is acquiring knowledge of an 
explicit expression. If the painter uses Picasso’s minotaur figure as part of his acquired 
education, he uses a protected expression. 
396 Aesthetic criteria are often considered as methods, facts, or abstract ideas that are 
not copyrightable. Nevertheless, aesthetic criteria at their early stages in a specific 
creative field may be considered as explicit copyrightable expression. This is the case 
when a second author wishes to use explicit expressions from a previous work in the same 
field because of the aesthetic value he attaches to them. For example, assuming the 
Picasso was the first to express the female body in a non-proportional way in which the 
organs are presented as cubes, it is possible to think of such an expression as 
copyrightable. A second author who applies this aesthetic criterion may be using a 
protected expression. Whether this would be considered a use of expression or a use of a 
mere idea depends of the level of abstraction in which the idea/expression dichotomy is 
referred to. 
397 See generally WALLAS, supra note 33. 
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To illustrate the spectrum of the match between the cognitive 
process of creation and copyright law, this Article returns to the 
Cather in the Rye example.403 The match between copyright law and 
                                                                                                                            
398 See generally AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48. 
399 See generally Runco & Chand, supra note 74. 
400 See generally GUILFORD, supra note 102. 
401 See generally Gabora, supra note 111. 
402 See generally FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121. 
403 See generally SALINGER, supra note 388. 
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the cognitive approaches to creativity is reflected by the fact that 
the law allows making future works based upon Salinger’s book in 
different ways. Thus, it is possible to make another book that tells 
the story of a teenager going through complex adolescence in 
which he critically looks at adult life without it constituting copy-
right infringement. Such a work would rely substantially on prior 
knowledge of various types such as ideas, education, and aesthetic 
criteria from the first work. A different type of use that reflects the 
match between copyright law and the cognitive approaches to crea-
tivity is the use of explicit plot lines from the original work during 
the input and processing phases, so long as the output does not in-
clude these expressions. Copyright law also allows the use of expli-
cit scenes and plot lines, and even the character of Holden Caul-
field, to express a different mode of expression that substantially 
changes their original meaning. Under the fair use doctrine, it 
would probably be permissible to use the character of Holden Caul-
field and plot lines from the book to criticize the oppression of mi-
norities in a certain country without it constituting copyright in-
fringement. This would also allow reliance on prior knowledge. 
The mismatch between copyright law and the cognitive approaches 
to creativity exists when explicit protected expressions are used to 
make a new work of authorship—a sequel, for example. This was 
the case in Salinger v. Colting, where the court ruled that a sequel 
used explicit expressions from it and therefore infringed Salinger’s 
copyrights.404 
This Article argues that, in order to relax the tension between 
the legal doctrine and the cognitive approaches to creativity, it is 
first necessary to completely separate the reproduction right from 
the derivative work right. Second, in order to create a full match 
between the legal doctrine and the cognitive approaches to creativi-
ty, a shift in the remedies regime is warranted. This Article does 
not argue that these changes to the legal doctrine are justified solely 
by the cognitive understanding of creativity; they are also justified 
by intra-legal normative justifications to copyright law, which could 
not be discussed here. This Article does, however, argue that such 
changes could better fit the creative behavior of human beings and 
                                                                                                                            
404 See 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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that, if normatively justified, they should replace the current doc-
trine which does not fit the behavior it governs. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a mismatch between important copyright law doc-
trines and the cognitive understanding of creativity. Specifically, 
this Article focuses on the distinction between derivative works 
and original works, and the idea/expression dichotomy. To subs-
tantiate this claim, it discusses theoretical approaches to creativity 
as well as empirical and historical studies that focus on the process 
of creation. Under all approaches to creativity, the creative process 
could be divided into two main processes. The first is unfocused 
thought in which abstract ideas are generated. The second refers to 
the process of crystallization of the unfocused thought into con-
crete perceivable products using task-relevant knowledge and 
memory. Both explicitly and through a suggested reading of the 
literature, theoretical approaches to creativity view both ideas and 
expressions as knowledge components that are inherent to the cre-
ative process. 
These notions from the cognitive psychology of creativity dis-
course assist in portraying several potential implications for copy-
right law. This Article explains that one implication could apply to 
the originality requirement in copyright law in that the analysis 
should shift from the originality of a work as a whole to the original-
ity of its specific components, which courts often do already. It also 
suggests that post-modern approaches which require an idea of 
original contribution of an individual author are not consistent with 
the cognitive process of creation. While the cognitive understand-
ing of creativity shows that many components of the creative 
process are based on prior knowledge, it also acknowledges a signif-
icant independent contribution of the author. 
This Article’s main goal is to articulate the argument that the 
distinction copyright law makes between derivative works (based 
on protected expressions) and original works (based on ideas and 
unprotected expressions) is an intra-legal normative distinction and 
is not based on any justification inherent to creativity. In this sense, 
this Article argued that there is no qualitative difference between 
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original works and derivative works under the cognitive approaches 
to creativity. Likewise, the idea/expression dichotomy also finds no 
justification in creativity. Therefore, if the distinction between de-
rivative works and original works is merely a normative legal one, 
the mismatch between creativity and the law could justify a more 
careful evaluation of the normative intra-legal justifications to cop-
yright law. Such evaluation will be developed in future research. 
